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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) and 
§ 78-2A-3(2)(h). This appeal was from a district court to the 
Utah Supreme Court and was transferred by the Supreme Court to 
the Court of Appeals pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2A-3(2)(h) and pursuant to Rule 4A of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and Rule 4A of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS ^ELOW 
This appeal is from a judgment on a jury verdict rendered in 
favor of plaintiff and against defendants and from the trial 
court's denial of plaintifffs motion for new trial or additur. 
Plaintiff filed an action in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, alleging personal 
injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident. 
The action was the subject of a jury trial from February 2 
to February 18, 1987. The jury apportioned seventy-five percent 
of the fault in causing the accident to defendants and 
twenty-five percent to plaintiff. The jury found total damages 
of $16,850. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was plaintiff prejudiced or denied a fair trial by any 
statements or conduct of the trial court? 
2. Is plaintiff's claim of prejudice resulting from the 
conduct of the trial judge barred by his failure to object to the 
conduct at trial? 
3. Did the trial court err in refusing to exclude the 
testimony of Lincoln Clark, M.D.? 
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4. Did the trial court err in excluding evidence sought to 
be admitted by plaintiff? 
5. Did the trial court err in submitting to the jury the 
issue of the relative degrees of fault of plaintiff and of 
defendant Bates? 
6. Was the verdict of the jury with regard to fault and 
damages supported by the evidence? 
7. Did the trial court err in failing to grant plaintiff's 
motions for new trial or additur? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed an action in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, alleging personal 
injuries resulting from a two vehicle accident which occurred on 
June 15, 1984. Plaintiff alleged he suffered a "closed head 
brain injury" and a low back injury. 
The action was the subject of a jury trial from February 2 
to February 18, 1987. The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
plaintiff finding that defendant Bates was seventy-five percent 
at fault in the causing of the accident and determining that 
plaintiff had suffered damages totaling $16,850.00. The damages 
awarded to plaintiff were reduced by twenty-five percent by 
reason of the negligence attributed to plaintiff by the jury. 
Plaintiff's motions for new trial or for an additur were 
denied by the trial court. 
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment on the jury verdict and 
from the order denying the motion for new trial or for additur. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
LIABILITY 
This action arises from a two vehicle accident which occurred 
on June 15, 1984, on 900 East Street near its intersection with 
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Fort Union Boulevard (7105 South), Salt Lake County, Utah. In 
the vicinity of the accident scene, 900 East has two north-bound 
travel lanes and a left turn lane; the north-bound lanes of 
travel are separated from the south-bound lanes by a slightly 
elevated median divider. (Exh. 5—Investigating Officer's 
Accident Report; a copy is attached as Appendix A.) 
Plaintiff was driving his 1978 AMC Concord in the inside 
north-bound lane of 900 East. (Exh.5) Plaintiff was traveling 
from his place of employment at a construction project at approxi-
mately 8000 South and 100 East (T. 162) and was traveling to his 
home at 914 Paris Lane (4390 South) for lunch. (T. 181) As 
Plaintiff approached the intersection, his speed was forty-five 
miles per hour (T. 181) . 
Defendant Pam Bates, operating a 1983 Honda automobile, was 
exiting a parking lot from a driveway located on the east side of 
900 East and south of the intersection with Fort Union Boulevard. 
(Exh. 5) Mrs. Bates was intending to make a left turn off of 900 
East to travel west-bound on Fort Union Boulevard to deliver 
documents to her husband, the vice-president of Pro Roofing. (T. 
J96-97) 
Defendant Bates pulled from the driveway and crossed the two 
travel lanes to enter the left turn lane; her speed was approxi-
mately ten to fifteen miles per hour. (Exh. 5, T. K46) 
Plaintiff saw the Bates vehicle in the roadway and swerved 
and braked (T. 182) leaving a relatively Straight skid mark 
approximately 105 feet in length. (Exh. 5, T. A54-56) At impact, 
the Bates vehicle was pointed essentially north (Exh. 5); the 
3 
right side of plaintiff's vehicle struck the left rear of the 
Bates' vehicle at a shallow angle. (Exh. 5) The speed differen-
tial between the two vehicles at the moment of impact was approxi-
mately ten miles per hour. (T. K46) The impact was of a slight 
brushing nature. (T. K42) The body damage to plaintiff's 
vehicle is reflected in Exhibit 2A; a copy of that photograph is 
attached as Appendix B. 
The left turn lane on 900 East begins approximately 110 feet 
from the intersection; the skid mark from the left front tire of 
plaintiff's vehicle begins approximately 170 feet from the 
intersection; the impact occurred approximately 100 feet from the 
intersection. (Exh. 5; Exh. 151—A scale diagram of the accident 
scene prepared by Frank Grant.) 
Plaintiff's version of the accident was given in great 
detail on both direct and cross examination. (T. 181-83 and 
1147-48) He was traveling to the left of a large truck. Plaintiff 
contends that at a point 100 to 200 yards from the intersection 
the truck signaled for a right turn and then suddenly stopped. 
Plaintiff then saw the Bates vehicle crossing the road in front 
of him. Plaintiff contends he swerved to the left and went over 
the median; his car came to a sudden stop and then turned straight 
to the right and back onto the road. Plaintiff testified he the 
stepped on his brakes and stopped and saw the Bates vehicle 
behind him in the north-bound land; plaintiff's vehicle was in 
the left turn lane. Plaintiff saw cars behind him in the left 
turn lane, so he pulled in front of the Bates vehicle. (T. 
181-83) Plaintiff contends his car went onto the median before 
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impact. (T. 185) Plaintiff claims he was dazed and sat in his 
car for "a couple of minutes" before getting out (T. 188) 
The investigating officer, Deputy Leavitt, testified that 
the physical evidence at the scene consisted of the damage to the 
vehicles and a skid mark on the road surface. (T. A44) Deputy 
Leavitt also talked to the parties involved. (T. A44-45) The 
skid mark was one hundred-five feet in length as measured by 
Deputy Leavitt (T. A54) There was no bredk in the skid, but 
there was a deviation in the skid to the left probably indicating 
the point of impact between the two vehicles. (T. A5 6) The skid 
mark appeared to be from the left front tire of plaintiff's 
vehicle. (T. A57) Deputy Leavitt's opinion of the speed of 
plaintiff's vehicle prior to the accident was between forty and 
forty-five miles per hour. Deputy Leavitt was of the opinion 
that the speed of plaintiff's vehicle at the time of impact was 
between fifteen to twenty miles per hour maximum; he was of the 
opinion that the speed of the Bates' vehicle at the time of 
impact was approximately ten miles per hour. (T. C69) Deputy 
Leavitt did not observe any skid mark other than the one drawn on 
his accident report diagram; he had no reason to believe that the 
skid mark was from other than the left side of plaintiff's 
vehicle. (T. C87) Deputy Leavitt did not observe any physical 
evidence to indicate that the left wheel of the plaintiff's 
vehicle went on the median. (T. C92) On redirect examination by 
plaintiff's counsel, Deputy Leavitt testified that at the time of 
the accident 900 East Street was a busy, heavily travelled major 
road with two or three shopping centers and a school nearby. (T. 
C91) 
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Frank Grant, an expert in accident reconstruction testifying 
on behalf of defendants, rendered his opinion that the speed of 
plaintiff's vehicle prior to the time he undertook any braking or 
evasive action was forty-five miles per hour. (T. K43) Mr. 
Grant rendered his opinion that the speed of the Bates vehicle at 
the time of impact was fifteen miles per hour or less and the 
plaintiff's vehicle was traveling approximately ten miles per 
hour faster than the Bates1 vehicle. (T. K46) Mr. Grant rendered 
his opinion that there was nothing to indicate that plaintiff's 
vehicle went onto the median. (T. K46-47) Mr. Grant rendered 
his opinion that the accident was caused by defendant Bates 
making a wide right turn and by plaintiff traveling too fast for 
the conditions existing at the scene. (T. K49-50) Mrs. Bates 
testified that immediately following the impact, the Onyeabor 
vehicle was located behind hers. (T. L20) Phillip Bates, Pam's 
husband, arrived at the scene approximately ten minutes after the 
accident occurred (T. L54) and observed the location, of both of 
the vehicles involved in the accident. (T. L56-57) On cross-
examination, Mr. Bates estimated the distance between the inter-
section and the Bates vehicle, which had not been moved, as not 
quite 100 feet. (T. L61) 
Plaintiff's accident reconstruction witness, Dennis Andrews, 
testified that a driver's normal reaction time is one second; 
reaction time is the time it takes a driver to recognize a hazard 
and then apply the brakes. (T. C114) Mr. Andrews rendered his 
opinion that the left front wheel of plaintiff's vehicle went up 
and onto the center divider (T. C118). He testified that at 
impact, the speed of plaintiff's vehicle was thirty-three miles 
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per hour (T. C106) and the northward speed of the Bates vehicle 
at impact was five miles per hour (T. C108) resulting in a speed 
differential at impact of twenty-eight miles per hour. 
Injuries and Damages 
Dr. Edward Spencer, an orthopedic specialist called by 
defendants, initially examined plaintiff in January 1985 and 
diagnosed a degenerative lumbar disc. While Dr. Spencer felt the 
degenerative disc might or might not have related to the 
automobile accident, he assumed it to be because of a denial by 
plaintiff of earlier back problems. Initially, Dr. Spencer gave 
the plaintiff a five percent permanent partial impairment rating. 
(T. 110-11) Following a subsequent examination in April 1986, 
Dr. Spencer was of the opinion that there was a large element of 
psychogenic pain as a cause or source of plaintiff's complaints; 
psychogenic pain is pain without an objective basis; that is, 
with an emotional cause or voluntary cause. (T. 118) Dr. Spencer 
revised his earlier impairment rating to ten percent based on 
reduced motion; however, Dr. Spencer noted that the impairment 
rating was based on voluntary movement and was flawed because it 
required plaintiff's control and might not be an accurate measure 
of his true impairment. Dr. Spencer also testified that if 
plaintiff followed an exercise program he would probably return 
to the original five percent impairment. (T. 118-19) Dr. 
Spencer also stated on cross-examination that if plaintiff had 
surgery on the herniated disc with a good result, his impairment 
may be five percent. (T. 122) Dr. Spencer did acknowledge that 
if plaintiff had ongoing pain and limited range of motion following 
the surgery he would give the plaintiff a ten percent permanent 
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impairment rating. (T. 124) On cross-examination, Dr. Spencer 
testified that he couldn't say the back problem was definitely 
caused by the auto accident; he assumed it was caused by the auto 
accident because he had no earlier medical records or history of 
an earlier injury or trouble. (T. 136) 
A CT scan examination of the plaintiff on August 31, 1984, 
revealed a "bulging disc." (Exh. 34) A CT scan nine months 
later on May 13, 1985, indicated a disc herniation. (Exh. 49) 
Thomas Soderberg, M.D., plaintifffs orthopedic specialist, 
testified that a bulging disc would generally be considered to be 
milder in degree than a herniated disc. (T. D374) Dr. Soderberg 
testified that the most common cause of a bulging disc is a 
compression type of injury where a load is applied, particularly 
if associated with some bending; he acknowledged that compression 
and bending and lifting heavy weights could cause a bulging disc 
as could a slip and fall, an auto accident or a sports injury; 
certainly such injury was not related to auto accidents alone. 
(T. D375) There was substantial evidence that prior to the 
accident plaintiff had engaged in much heavy lifting (T. D305, 
D311, J75 and J89) including lifting one end of a piano by 
himself while two men lifted the other end. (T. J91) 
Thomas Houts, M.D., a neurologist, was plaintiff's first 
treating physician. Dr. Houts first saw the plaintiff on August 
29, 1984. (T. G8) Following the examination and review of a CT 
scan of the lower back on September 7, 19 84, Dr. Houts diagnosed 
a lumbar strain of a muscular nature and a herniated disc. Dr. 
Houts assumed that the back complaints related to the auto 
accident based upon plaintiff's denial of prior back pain. Dr. 
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Houts prescribed bed rest and muscle relaxants as treatment. (T. 
G12-13) Dr. Houts next saw plaintiff on September 20, 1984; at 
that time plaintiff was normal and he was released to return to 
activity. (T. G13-14) Dr. Houts next saw plaintiff on February 
1, 1985; at that time plaintiff reported that his back had been 
bothering him for about three months and that the back had 
aggravated or flared-up in a karate class. (T. G14-15) 
Plaintiff's claim of closed-head brain injury was substan-
tially disputed by the evidence. Plaintiff claimed that in the 
collision with defendant's automobile, his automobile was thrown 
onto and off of the median causing him to strike his head on the 
interior of the vehicle. The evidence reflected that plaintiff 
exited his car and was pounding on the window of defendant's 
Bates vehicle and yelling obscenities at her within five seconds 
after the vehicle came to rest. (T. L20-21) Within fifteen 
minutes after the occurrence of the accident, Phillip Bates was 
in close proximity to plaintiff; he did not observe any injury to 
plaintiff's head or face. (T. L26) Deputy Leavitt did not 
observe any apparent difficulties on plaintiff's part in verbally 
reporting to him about the accident or in making a written 
statement; the plaintiff denied any injury and Deputy Leavitt did 
not observe any injury to plaintiff. (T. C88-89) At his first 
visit to Dr. Houts on August 29, 1984, plaintiff told Dr. Houts 
he had been severely jostled or jarred, but denied striking any 
portion of his body inside the car. (T. G9-10.) Dr. Houts did 
not observe any evidence of memory loss or confusion during his 
course of treatment of plaintiff. (T. G17-18) There was no 
evidence of any loss of consciousness by plaintiff in the accident. 
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Plaintiff complained of intellectual impairment following 
the accident. However, for example, the transcript of plaintiff's 
grades at Utah Technical College (Exh. 21), which he attended 
prior to the accident, reveals class grades and grade point 
averages substantially the same as the transcript of grades at 
the University of Utah (Exh. 23), which he attended after the 
accident. This is so even though the classes at the University 
were of a more difficult nature. 
Prior to the accident, plaintiff was attending school on a 
full-time basis. For several days prior to the accident he had 
worked as a rough carpenter on a construction project. (T. 167) 
Plaintiff was initially paid $8.00 per hour, but his wage was 
reduced to $5.00 per hour because of his slowness on the job. 
(T. 164-67) His prior employment had been of a sporadic and 
short term nature with wages typically in the $4.00—$5.00 per 
hour range; he was seldom employed in the construction industry. 
(Exh. 143). 
LINCOLN CLARK, M.D. AS A WITNESS 
Defendants' amended witness and exhibit list containing Dr. 
Clark's name was filed and served on January 21, 1987. The 
proposed pretrial order signed by both counsel on November 6, 
1986, (R. 228-248) provided that at least ten days prior to 
trial, each party would serve upon opposing counsel a list of all 
witnesses who would or might be called at trial. (R. 246) The 
order did provide the list should be mailed at least thirteen 
days prior to trial to insure that opposing counsel would receive 
it at least eleven days prior to trial; plaintiff's counsel 
acknowledges receiving that list on the January 22, ten days 
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prior to trial. (Appellant's Brief p. 80) 
Defendants concede that at a hearing on December 5, 198 6, 
Dr. Clark stated he would not testify in the action. At that 
hearing, Dr. Clark stated that after examining the plaintiff and 
based on his professional experience, including testimony in 
major criminal and in civil commitment hearings, the plaintiff 
constituted a threat to him, his family, to defendant Bates and 
to Dr. Thomas Houts and that Dr. Clark's appearance as a witness 
at trial opposing the plaintiff would place himself and his wife 
in physical jeopardy (T. S4-10; S13-15) Subsequent events caused 
Dr. Clark to determine that he could appear as a witness in the 
case without exposing himself to an unreasonable risk of harm. 
(T. L124-29) Plaintiff's counsel also perceived the potential 
risk of harm to Dr. Clark as is indicated by a series of questions 
and answers in which Mr. Sykes phoned a warning to Dr. Clark 
after receiving a phone call from plaintiff's wife. (T. L132-33.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Plaintiff contends that the trial court commented, both 
verbally and non-verbally, on the evidence. Although numerous 
"comments" are claimed plaintiff made no objections at trial. The 
claim of error was made for the first time in plaintiff's motion 
for new trial. Even so, the trial court instructed the jury that 
anything said or done by the court during the course of the trial 
should not be considered as indicating the court's view as to any 
issue. A review of the so-called "comments", within context of 
the questions, testimony and objections made at the time, reveal 
that such "comments" were statements neuttal in content and tone 
and within the discretion of the trial court. 
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2. The withdrawal of Dr. Lincoln Clark as a witness was 
precipitated by the plaintiff's conduct which Dr. Clark assessed 
as a threat to himself and his family. When Dr. Clark subsequently 
concluded he could appear as a witness, timely notice of his 
appearance was given to plaintiff's counsel. A copy of Dr. Clark's 
written report was furnished to plaintiff's counsel on February 
4, 1987, as provided by the order of the trial court in connection 
with its denial of plaintiff's motion in limine. Plaintiff's 
counsel conducted a lengthy and learned cross-examination of Dr. 
Clark at trial. The trial court's refusal to exclude Dr. Clark's 
testimony was proper, particularly so in light of the fact that 
Dr. Clark's initial withdrawal as a witness was precipitated by 
plaintiff's own conduct. 
3. The trial court's exclusion of exhibits and testimony 
was proper; such exclusion did not prejudice plaintiff. 
4. There was conflicting evidence with regard to the 
occurrence of the accident. The question of the reasonableness of 
the conduct of plaintiff and defendant in operating their vehicles 
was one for the jury. The court properly instructed the jury as 
to the duties of the parties on the issue of liability. 
5. The nature and extent of any injury suffered by plaintiff 
was sharply contested. Substantial evidence was introduced from 
which the jury could properly determine that plaintiff's back 
injuries were substantially less severe than he claimed. The 
jury could conclude from the evidence that plaintiff did not 
suffer any brain injury. The trial court properly concluded that 
the negligence attributed by the jury to plaintiff and the amount 
of damages awarded were supported by the evidence and the trial 
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court properly refused to grant an additur or a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF RECEIVED A FAIR TRIAL AND WAS NOT 
PREJUDICED BY ANY CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE. 
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW 
Under Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, ,f[t]he court 
shall not comment on the evidence in the case . . . ." The Utah 
Supreme Court has defined this prohibited behavior as: 
[C]ommenting on the quality or Credibility of 
the evidence in such a way as to indicate 
that the trial court favors the claims or 
position of either party. 
State v. Sanders, 27 Utah 2nd 354, 496 P.2d 270, 275 (1972); see 
also, State v. Long, 721 P.2d 493, 496 (Utah 1986) (Hall, C.J., 
concurring and dissenting) . 
This rule, however, does not prohibit the court from includ-
ing "general statements concerning certain types of evidence, nor 
concerning the burdens of proof and sometimes varying degrees of 
proof required." Id. Nor does the rule prevent the trial court 
from expressing the reasons for its decisions on motions, objec-
tions, and the like. Ortega v. Thomas, 14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d. 
406, 408 (1963). See also, Vegodsky v. City of Tucson, 1 Ariz. 
App. 102, 399 P.2d 723 (1965). This is especially true where the 
jury is subsequently instructed that the court did not intend to 
invade their province of judging the credibility of the witnesses 
and the weight of the evidence. Ortega, 383 P.2d 406. See also, 
Mahoney v. Mitchell, 668 P.2d 35 (Haw. App. 1983). Further, the 
trial court's actions have been upheld where the court commented 
that the evidence "did not show much" was true, Hogqe v. Salt 
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Lake and O.RY. Co., 47 Utah 266, 153 P. 585 (1915), and where the 
court asked counsel whether or not a matter was objectionable, 
Paul v. Zions First National Bank, 18 Utah 2d 183, 417 P.2d 759 
(1966) . 
Furthermore, it is not improper for the trial court to 
question the witnesses. State v. Mellon, 583 P.2d 46, 48 (Utah 
1978); Cintron v. Milkovich, 611 P.2d 730 (Utah 1980). In order 
for such questioning by the trial court to be overturned as 
improper, it must go "beyond clarification, explanation, or 
addition to the evidence," or show prejudice to one party's 
claim. Id. 
The trial court has significant discretion in conducting the 
course of the trial. In Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 
P.2d 520 (1948), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
But we must keep in mind that judges may not 
sit as sphinxes on the bench nor should they 
be near umpires. They should, to a certain 
extent, guide the course of the trial and 
when a witness is wandering or digressing, 
tactfully bring him back into line. 
Id. at 525. 
If, however, it is established that the trial court has 
committed error the question becomes "whether there was any error 
of a sufficiently substantial nature that it is reasonable to 
believe that it adversely affected the appellant or deprived him 
of a fair trial in such a way that in the absence of such error 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been 
different." Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811, 
814 (1972). See also, Ortega v. Thomas, 383 P.2d 406 (Utah 
1963) . 
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Finally, if a trial court has erred by actually commenting 
on the evidence, it is imperative that the counsel object to such 
comment and conduct. The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
It would be manifestly unjust to permit a 
party to sit silently by, believing that 
prejudicial error had been committed, to see 
the trial to its completion, and allow the 
jury to deliberate and reach a verdict, to 
see if he wins, then if he loses, come 
forward with a claim that such an error 
rendered the verdict a nullity. If this 
could be done, proceedings after such an 
occurrence would be in vain and thus an 
imposition upon the court, the jury and all 
concerned. The court will not countenance 
any such mockery of its proceedings. If 
something occurs which the party thinks is 
wrong and so prejudicial to him that he 
thereafter cannot have a fair trial, he must 
make his objection promptly and seek redress 
by moving for a mistrial, or by having 
cautionary instructions given, if that is 
deemed adequate, or be held to ^aive whatever 
rights may have existed to do s0. 
Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55, 377 P.2d 186, 188 (1962). See 
also, Meier v. Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734 (1964). 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff devotes a substantial portion of his brief to his 
contention that plaintiff was prejudiced by the conduct of the 
trial court. The alleged conduct includes: (1) direct comments 
on the evidence, (2) sua sponte interjections by the trial judge, 
(3) the demeanor and other non-verbal conduct of the trial judge 
and (4) permitting arguments on evidence to be made in presence 
of the jury. Each of these four classes of alleged "comments" is 
addressed individually and specifically below. Preliminarily, 
however, a few comments are in order. 
A. Extensiveness of Plaintiff's Presentation. The case 
was tried on February 2 through February 17, 1987, a total of 
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eleven trial days. During the course of the trial, thirty-three 
witnesses testified; twenty of them as experts. Of the total 
witnesses, plaintiff called twenty-six, of whom fifteen were 
experts. Additionally, 108 of 113 offered exhibits were plain-
tiff's. One hundred-six exhibits were admitted into evidence. 
Plaintiff's case in chief lasted from February 2 until the 
morning of February 12, 1987. Virtually all of the testimony and 
exhibits sought to be admitted by plaintiff were admitted during 
the course of trial such that plaintiff's claims were fully and 
completely presented to the jury. 
B. Waiver by Failing to Object. As is noted in the 
statement of applicable law, it is imperative that the party 
complaining of such comments or conduct object thereto during the 
course of the trial. A review of the transcript, and particularly 
those portions of the transcript included in the Appendix to 
plaintiff's brief herein, does not disclose a single instance in 
which the conduct now complained of was objected to or otherwise 
called to the attention of the trial judge. 
Plaintiff may not "sit silently by, believing that prejudicial 
error has been committed, to see the trial to its completion, and 
allow the jury to deliberate and reach a verdict, to see if he 
wins, then if he loses, come forward with a claim that such an 
error rendered the verdict a nullity." Hill v. Cloward, 377 P.2d 
188. 
C. Cautionary Jury Instruction. In its charge to the 
jury, the trial court included its Instruction No. 2 which 
stated: 
Anything done or said by me during the trial 
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should not be considered by you as indicating 
my view on any issue in this case. Any 
belief you may have as to what my view may be 
should receive no consideration by you in 
your deliberations. 
(R. 618) Such a cautionary instruction is sufficient to advise 
the jury that any conduct of the trial judge is not to be consid-
ered in any way by the jury in its deliberations. 
CLAIMED DIRECT COMMENTS 
Plaintiff claims that on fourteen occasions during the 
course of the trial, the trial judge made direct comments upon 
the evidence. The portions of the trial transcript containing 
the claimed comments are designated items 1 through 14 in the 
Appendix to plaintiff's Brief. 
A review of those portions of the transcript itself (rather 
than plaintiff's "tables") reveal that virtually all of the 
instances cited by plaintiff are not comments on the evidence but 
are simply explanatory statements made by the court either in the 
course of ruling on objections, or limiting the admissibility of 
evidence or testimony, or clarifying the testimony given by a 
witness. Instances falling within this category are Appendix 
items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14. 
For example, as to Appendix item 2 plaintiff asserts in his 
Table I that the trial judge cast doubt on the validity of the 
expert's testimony as to the value of lost future earnings by 
referring to it as "pure speculation". The context of the phrase 
"pure speculation" was that plaintiff's counsel asked the 
witness to calculate the plaintiff's lost future earnings by 
assuming plaintiff would earn $6.00 per hour in the first year, 
$10.00 per hour in the second year, $15.00 per hour in the third 
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year and so on to a level of $40,000 per year in the tenth year. 
Defendants objected that such incremental increases were without 
support in the evidence. In response to that objection, the 
court stated: 
It seems to me it is pure speculation that in 
the first year he is going to make $6.00 an 
hourf in the next year $10.00 an hour and the 
next year $15.00 an hour. I think that is 
pure speculation. 
(T. K20) Plaintiff also asserts with regard to Appendix item 2 
that the trial court revealed his opinion of the plaintiff's 
earning potential by allowing only testimony of $5.00 an hour to 
be received. Again, referring to the transcript for the proper 
context, while the trial court sustained the defendants' objection 
with regard to assuming incremental increases in the plaintiff's 
income as being unsupported by the evidence (T. K21-22), the 
court did allow a calculation based upon $5.00 per hour, which 
amount was supported by testimony as to plaintiff's earnings at 
the time of the accident. Mr. Fjelsted then testified that the 
present value of future earnings paid on a weekly basis of 
$200.00 during the plaintiff's 32.1 year life expectcincy would be 
$212,689 (T. K23). Plaintiff's attorney did not attempt to 
elicit from Mr. Fjelsted any other figures regarding the present 
value of future earnings based on initial assumptions of other 
than $5.00 per hour. For this reason, there is no basis to 
assert that the trial court allowed "only testimony of $5.00." 
Similarly, Appendix item 5 is characterized by plaintiff as 
a sua sponte opinion that one of plaintiff's witnesses, Linda 
Gummow, a neuropsychologist, was not qualified to render an 
opinion as to whether Mr. Onyeabor was unconscious at the scene 
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because she was not present. Viewing the court's comments in 
proper context shows the court's dialogue had nothing to do with 
Dr. Gummow's qualifications as a expert or the weight to be given 
to her testimony. The court was only limiting Dr. Gummow's 
testimony on re-redirect to the scope of re-cross. Defendants' 
re-cross examination of that witness had been limited to the 
inter-relationship of verifiable brain injury and length of 
unconsciousness. Plaintiff's re-redirect inquiry about "gradation11 
of consciousness was clearly too broad. 
Q [By Mr. Sykes] What are some of the 
gradations in loss of consciousness that 
might apply to someone like Mr. Onyeabor? 
MR. STEGALL: The gradation? 
Well, Your Honor, I think she answered 
the question about what she was told, 
and we're getting beyond - -
THE COURT: Yes, I think so. 
MR. STEGALL: - - beyond that question. 
MR. SYKES: Well, I just asked about the 
gradation. Is that a — 
THE COURT: You have had a witness here 
that talked to him immediately after the 
accident. And all she knows about 
whether he experienced any unconscious-
ness or not is what he told her. She 
wasn't there, and she's talked to him 
about it. And she — that's all I'm 
going to let her testify to, as to what 
— based upon what he told her, her 
conclusion was as to whether or not he 
did or did not lose consciousness. 
MR. SYKES: Okay. I have no further 
questions, Your Honor, of this witness. 
(T. H28-31) 
A review of the other Appendix items enumerated above (1-5, 
7-11, 13 and 14) reveal that in the context of the questions, the 
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answers, the objections and the statements by the court with 
regard to those objections, the trial court was not commenting 
upon the evidence, but was, rather, ruling upon objections, 
limiting evidence to which objections had been made, or clarifying 
testimony which had been given. 
In addition to plaintiff's assertions that the trial court 
commented on witness testimony, plaintiff asserts in his Table I 
the trial court discredited documentary evidence by making 
disparaging comments about the use of exhibit notebooks given to 
jurors at the beginning of the trial and "severely scolded" 
counsel in front of the jury (Appendix item 6). The exhibit 
notebooks referred to consisted of loose-leaf binders each 
containing approximately seventy-six exhibits; the contents were 
approximately two and one-half inches thick. One such exhibit 
notebook was given by plaintiff's counsel to each juror so that 
reference could be made to specific exhibits as they were admitted. 
Defendant's counsel opposed the use of the exhibit books prior to 
and at a hearing on motions i_n limine on January 30, 1987. At 
that time, the trial judge expressed his concern that the notebooks 
contained exhibits which might not be received and would be 
distracting to the jury. Plaintiff's counsel assured the trial 
court that the exhibit notebooks could be used without distracting 
the jury. The trial judge did determine that he would permit 
plaintiff to use the exhibit notebooks. (T. Q55-59) 
Plaintiff's Appendix item 6 relates to control of the use of 
those exhibit notebooks by the trial court. Earlier in the day 
during Dr. Soderberg's testimony, reference was made to exhibit 
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number 34, a written report of the CT examination performed on 
the plaintiff. The interchange between plaintiff's counsel was 
as follows: 
MR. SYKES: Your Honor, that is in the 
books. And if it would be okay I'd like 
to have the jury turn to that for a 
moment. 
JUDGE CROFT: Well, the Doctor's telling 
them everything that's in it. I think 
they can follow it. If they want to 
look at it it's all right. 
JUDGE CROFT: The trouble with them 
trying to read what's in the exhibit is 
they might miss the doctor's testimony. 
And that's what they should hear. 
(T. D325) 
Shortly thereafter, Dr. Soderberg testified that he had 
prescribed a cane for the plaintiff; the prescription was received 
as exhibit number 52 and plaintiff's counsel stated: 
MR. SYKES: I don't know if the jury has that 
in their books. Could they check quickly? 
JUDGE CROFT: Well, it is a prescription for 
a cane. I don't think it's necessary that 
they examine it, they will see it in the jury 
room when they consider the case. 
MR. SYKES: Okay, 
(T. D333) 
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff's counsel made a reference 
to exhibit 16, which stated in its entirety: ,fI examined Mr. 
Onyeabor today. He has no health problems. He should be able to 
participate in all school activities." At that point, the 
following interchange occurred: 
MR. SYKES: Okay. If you could turn to 
exhibit 16 again—and may the jury also, 
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Your Honor, turn to exhibit 16? 
JUDGE CROFT: If they wish. 
(T. D348) 
On redirect examination, Dr. Soderberg was asked to refer to 
page one of exhibit 51, a four page office chart maintained by 
Dr. Soderberg. Again, plaintiff's counsel asked if the jury 
could refer to the exhibit to which the trial judge replied: 
JUDGE CROFT: If it's helpful. I don't know 
that they need to look at the book every time 
the Doctor says something about the exhibit. 
(T. D382-383) 
The witness following Dr. Soderberg was Doctor Gerald 
Moress. In redirect examination the doctor was asked to identify 
an EMG report, exhibit 55. Although not objecting to the receipt 
of the exhibit, defendant's counsel did object to the line of 
questions regarding it as being beyond the scope of cross-
examination. The trial court permitted Dr. Moress to be ques-
tioned concerning the EMG report at which point the following 
occurred: 
MR. SYKES: May we have the jury turn to 
that, Your Honor, to 55? 
JUDGE CROFT: Why don't you ask him the 
question and I think the jury can get it 
easier from what the doctor says than 
they can trying to read what the book 
says. And all of you follow what the 
doctor is saying at the same time. 
MR. SYKES: Your Honor, the only reason 
I do that, I think it would be helpful 
to see and hear at the same time. 
JUDGE CROFT: Okay. Let's have an 
understanding that any time the jury 
wants to pick up the book to look at the 
exhibit that the witness is talking 
about you are free to do so, if you 
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don't want to you donft have to. 
MR. SYKES: Okay. I think it would be 
helpful in this case, Your Honor. 
JUDGE CROFT: I'm going to let them make 
the decision because they may not find 
it that way. 
(T. D443-44) 
It is obvious from this history of events that the trial 
judge was concerned the use of the exhibit notebooks was becoming 
distracting to the jury. Nonetheless, after consulting with 
counsel that evening and the following morning, the trial court 
did advise the jurors that they should, at the request of plain-
tiff's counsel, examine the exhibit being testified to. He 
advised them that when the request was made, the jury was to look 
at the exhibit being considered, and when that exhibit was no 
longer needed, to close the exhibit book and not look through it 
further as there might be exhibits that were not yet in evidence. 
(T. E491) That procedure was followed by the court for the 
remainder of the trial. If the jury somehow perceived the trial 
judge's statements in controlling the use of the notebooks as 
disparaging, any such perception was cured by his directions on 
the morning of the fourth day of trial. 
The remaining Appendix item (12) in which a claimed direct 
comment was made occurred during the testimony of Patrick Chukwu. 
Plaintiff states that the trial judge referred to a Nigerian 
witness as "these young ones" thus demeaning the witness and 
other younger Nigerians who had previously testified. Mr. Chukwu 
was the third of three friends testifying for plaintiff; these 
witnesses were Emmanuel Uzoh, age thirty-one years, Robert Otti, 
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age thirty years and Mr. Chukwu, age thirty-two years. A review 
of their testimony reveals that all three witnesses tended to 
give lengthy narrative responses to specific questions. The 
context of the specific instance complained of in Appendix 12 can 
only be grasped by a review of the testimony preceeding it (T. 
D20-95) which is contained in Appendix D to this brief. 
As is seen from the transcript, for some period prior to the 
statement by the trial court, Mr. Chukwu was giving long, involved, 
narrative responses to specific questions. Objections had been 
made and the witness and plaintiff's counsel had been cautioned 
with regard to responding to the specific question. A similar 
problem had occurred during the examination of the two prior 
witnesses. As a result, the trial judge's statement that the 
"young ones tend to make a speech" was in fact an accurate 
statement. The term "young ones" was probably an unfortunate 
choice of words by the trial judge, but it is certainly stretching 
to describe the term as "demeaning" to Mr. Chukwu or to the other 
witnesses. 
SUA SPONTE INTERJECTIONS 
Plaintiff claims that on approximately twenty-seven occasions 
during the course of the trial the trial judge commented on the 
evidence by making sua sponte interjections and interruptions. 
Portions of the trial transcript containing the claimed comments 
are designated as items 15 through 35 in the Appendix to plain-
tiff's brief. 
A review of those portions of the transcript itself reveal 
that many of the claimed comments were simply statements made by 
the trial court properly requesting a witness to respond to the 
24 
question which was asked. The claimed comments falling within 
this category are Appendix items 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 28 30 and 
35. 
By way of example, plaintiff asserts in Table II in Appendix 
item 16 the trial court "interjected a comment to help the 
defense and scolded the plaintiff's expert witness." The 
interchange in question is as follows: 
Q [Mr. Stegall] Were the test scores 
helpful to him if he told you that he 
was 580 and, in fact, was 563? 
A [Mr. Zelig] I don't think there's a 
significant difference between the two 
scores. That's why I didn't pay too 
much attention to it. I think it would 
be an easy mistake to make, because they 
were so close together. 
THE COURT: That doesn't quite answer 
his question, Doctor. 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. It is not 
significant to me that there was 
significance in those two scores. 
(T. G95) 
Another such example is Appendix item 17 characterized by 
plaintiff in Table II as the trial court "interjecting to help 
defense and questioning plaintiff's expert on the basis of the 
expert's opinion." The interchange in question is as follows: 
Q [By Mr. Stegall] Okay. What did Mr. 
Onyeabor tell you about the jobs he 
held? 
A [By Mr. Heal] He described to me the 
types of activities he performed in 
Nigeria. In terms of estimating jobs or 
working with customers, hiring workers, 
training workers, securing materials and 
equipment, and overseeing construction. 
Q You took those at face value? 
0£ 
A I suppose• The other information I 
relied on was - -
THE COURT: Just answer the question. 
Did you take them at face value? That 
is the question. 
(T. J187) 
Substantially all of the remaining claimed comments are, 
upon examination, revealed to be proper statements by the trial 
judge to administer in orderly fashion evidence being introduced 
at trial. 
For example, Appendix item 15 is characterized by plaintiff 
in Table II as the trial judge "inviting defendants to object to 
an expert's qualifications and casting doubt upon the expert's 
qualifications." A review of the transcript indicates that Dr. 
Nielson testified very briefly concerning his professional 
qualifications. (T. D454) In the interchange between the trial 
judge and counsel complained of by plaintiff, the trial judge 
clarified Dr. Nielson's qualifications to render opinion testimony 
as follows: 
JUDGE CROFT: I assume, Mr. Stegall, 
you are not objecting to lack of qualifi-
cation testimony? 
MR. STEGALL: Your Honor, I understand 
the gentleman is an ENT specialist and--
JUDGE CROFT: You stipulate he is an 
expert in that field. 
MR. STEGALL: in the field. 
JUDGE CROFT: And can testify without 
further foundation? 
MR. STEGALL: In audiology, Your Honor. 
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JUDGE CROFT: All right, go ahead, Mr. 
Sykes. 
In Appendix item 19, plaintiff complains that the trial 
judge made a rude interjection implying that plaintiff's counsel 
had suggested an answer to the witness. The transcript reveals 
that plaintiff's counsel had asked a series of leading questions 
with regard to the calculation of the present value of future 
payments. (T. K5-7) The interchange between plaintiff's counsel 
and Mr. Fjelsted preceding the court's statement is as follows: 
Q [By Mr. Sykes] Okay. But just to 
illustrate the principle of how you 
arrive at that, what you are arriving at 
is a discount rate? 
A [By Mr. Fjelsted] Correct. 
Q Is that rate -- and I indicated earlier 
my example if you wanted to get $10,000 
of income in ten years — in the tenth 
year, let's say, and you want to know 
how much money, now you need to produce 
that, you have to apply a discount rate? 
A Correct. 
Q And that's why it is a lesser amount of 
money? 
A That is correct. 
Q But you get that discount rate? 
THE COURT: Are you asking him or 
telling him, Mr. Sykes? 
MR. SYKES: Well, you get that discount 
rate by taking the interest rate here 
minus — 
THE COURT: Let him tell you how he does 
it. 
MR. SYKES: All right. 
(T. K8-9) 
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Appendix item 24, is characterized by plaintiff as the trial 
judge "questioning one of plaintiff's experts as to whether he 
understands certain head injury terms." A review of the transcript 
(T. E494-497) reveals the plaintiff was seeking the admission of 
a video tape and a medical glossary. The glossary was to be used 
by the jury to look up medical terminology used both in the video 
tape and by the witness. The trial judge suggested that the 
witness endeavor to use plain English in his testimony rather 
than have the jury attempt to remember terms and look up those 
terms in a glossary. (T. E495-96) The following then occurred: 
Q (By Mr. Sykes) Tell us about the film — 
Who prepared it, when it was prepared 
approximately and this sort of thing. 
A The film was prepared at the University 
of Utah approximately, I'd say, about a 
year ago or within the last year. It is 
viewed predominently toward, for family 
members or people that don't understand 
brain injury and goes over, almost from 
start to finish, of what happens. It 
goes over all degrees of brain injury, 
it describes it and some of the conse-
quences and what happens. And it shows 
it very vividly. And I think it is a 
high quality film. Unfortunately, a 
couple places get a little technical and 
that's my only problem with it, Your 
Honor, in one area where they go over 
the anatomy. There is a neuroanatomist, 
Dr. Susan Stenson, who is excellent but 
she uses all the big terms. And I'd be 
glad to define any at that time if it is 
necessary. 
MR. SYKES: Perhaps — 
JUDGE CROFT: Well, you understand the 
terms? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I do, Your Honor. 
JUDGE CROFT: If they need explaining 
you can explain them to the jury, can't 
you? 
28 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I can. 
(T. E495-97) [Emphasis added]. Defendants' objection to the 
glossary was sustained; the video film was admitted over defen-
dants1 objection and was shown to the jury. (T. E498-99) 
From the context, it is evident the trial judge assumed the 
witness was familiar with medical terminology and was clarifying 
for the jury's benefit the fact the witness could help the jury 
understand the video without resorting to a glossary. 
Appendix item 25 is characterized by the plaintiff as the 
trial judge "questioning a plaintiff's expert about something 
which 'troubled' the trial court regarding the scope of a jury 
decision to decide the case." A review of the transcript reveals 
that the court was properly troubled with regard to a statement 
made by the witness which could have been perceived by the jury 
as meaning the witness expected the jury to make a specific 
finding in favor of plaintiff. When asked about his opinion as 
to whether the plaintiff had compensation syndrome, the following 
interchange occurred: 
A (Dr. Nilsson) Well, his — the majority 
of my interactions have not been typical 
of patients that I have followed who 
have compensation syndrome in the sense 
that he is more concerned that the truth 
be shown, and that he is helped to be 
more reassured of a good future, of 
being able to care for his family. He 
is very angry and he is very frustrated, 
and sees a lot of the court proceeding 
as an expression of that anger. But the 
end result being a validation of yes, 
you are injured and we will help you 
with your problems. 
[THE COURT:] There was one comment 
that the doctor made that troubled me 
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just a little bit, and that was that he 
expected this court to make a decision 
one way or another with respect to a 
particular injury. Did I misunderstand 
you, Doctor? 
THE WITNESS: It is not my expectation, 
Your Honor, no. But yet I think from my 
experience, head injury patients in 
general tend to see this as a final 
confrontation of proof. In fact, I have 
some patients who totally will verbalize 
this court will say whether I have a 
head injury or not. And obviously that 
is not the case. 
THE COURT: Your answer wasn't based 
upon the assumption that this court or 
the jury would make any determination on 
that, I guess; is that right? 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
(T. J38-39) [Emphasis added.] 
Appendix Item 26 is characterized by plaintiff as the trial 
court's "interjection to unnecessarily restrict redirect examina-
tion." Dr. Duncan Wallace, a psychiatrist, had been cross-examined 
by defendants with regard to the fact that Dr. Wallace was 
himself a plaintiff in closed-head brain injury litigation. Dr. 
Linda Gummow, one of plaintiff Onyeabor's witnesses, was also a 
witness in Dr. Wallace's litigation. On redirect examination, to 
rehabilitate Dr. Wallace, the witness was asked to distinguish 
between his injury and that of Mr. Onyeabor and was then asked 
about his own impairments. Defendants' objection was overruled. 
The witness described his impairments and difficulties for 
several pages of transcript (T. F742-44) at which point the 
complained of interchange occurred: 
Q (Mr. Sykes) Did you have a drop in I.Q.? 
A Probably had about a 10 to 12 point 
drop. 
Q What was your I.Q. before the incident? 
JUDGE CROFT: I think thatfs going a 
little bit far on it, Mr. Sykes. 
MR. SYKES: Well, I would like to know 
what his I.Q. is now because that does 
relate to the type of report he may have 
written here. 
MR. STEGALL: I think that gets into a 
lot of foundational questions we may not 
be prepared to get into with this 
witness. And — 
MR. SYKES: I will withdraw the question, 
it's not that important. 
JUDGE CROFT: I think he's answered it 
sufficiently. 
MR. SYKES: Okay. 
(T. F744-45) [Emphasis added.] Plaintiff is complaining now of 
testimony his counsel did not feel was important at trial. The 
witness had testified on direct as to his professional qualifica-
tions (T. E650-52) and on redirect as to his own impairments. 
Inquiry on redirect examination apparently aimed solely at 
bolstering the witness' testimony was properly terminated by the 
court. 
Appendix Item 27 is characterized by plaintiff as an inter-
jection by the trial judge "to attempt to narrow the scope of an 
answer by one of plaintiff's experts." The transcript reveals 
the witness was asked as to the number of his patients; the 
question was ambiguous as to whether it referred to total patients 
or brain injury patients. The trial judge was attempting to 
clarify that ambiguity. (T. J8-9) 
Appendix Item 31 is characterized as the trial judge "hassl-
ing" the witness as to the price of repair of his car's left 
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front tire. Two repair invoices (Exhibits 7 and 8) had just been 
received without objection when the following occurred: 
Q (Mr. Sykes) Mr. Onyeabor, did you tell 
us how much the amount of money was in 
the tire — I don't recall if you said 
that. 
THE COURT: Well, the exhibit speaks for 
itself. It is about $73.00. 
MR. SYKES: Okay. 
(T. I 102-03) The trial judge was hardly "hassling" the witness 
by properly noting that the exhibit just received spoke for 
itself as to the amount of the tire repair. 
Appendix Item 32 is characterized as an interjection by the 
trial judge because he didn't want plaintiff's father-in-law to 
testify about the fact he was hard of hearing. The transcript 
reveals that at the close of cross- examination of Mr. Pedersenf 
plaintiff's father-in-law, plaintiff's counsel initially stated 
he had no questions on redirect. The trial judge excused the 
witness at which point the following occurred: 
MR. SYKES: I do have one other quick ques-
tions, if I might. 
JUDGE CROFT: What is it? 
MR. SYKES: Do you have a slight hearing 
problem? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. SYKES: How long have you had it? 
JUDGE CROFT: That doesn't matter. 
THE WITNESS: All my life. 
JUDGE CROFT: Just a moment. 
MR. SYKES: That's all I have, Your Honor. 
(T. D311-12) Notwithstanding the statement of plaintiff's 
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counsel that he had one other question, he attempted to ask 
several which were clearly beyond the scope of cross-examination. 
The trial judge was attempting to control questions and answers; 
even so, the question was asked and answered. 
Appendix Item No. 33 is characterized by plaintiff as an 
interruption by the trial judge to have evidence admitted before 
plaintiff's counsel had finished laying the foundation therefor. 
A review of the transcript (T. D476-77) reflects that plaintiff 
was seeking the admission of three anatomical drawings (Exhibits 
91, 92 and 93); the three exhibits were within the view of the 
jury as Dr. Goka was asked to explain their relevance. The trial 
court properly suggested to counsel that the three exhibits be 
placed into evidence so they could be considered by the jury. 
All three exhibits were received without objection by defendants. 
(T. D477) 
Exhibit Item 35 is characterized by plaintiff as an unneces-
sary "scolding" of counsel on an evidentiary matter. The tran-
script reveals that plaintiff's counsel asked a number of founda-
tional questions with regard to certain medical reports. (T. 
D455-56) After having the witness identify the various reports 
but before having them admitted into evidence, plaintiff's 
counsel asked the witness the results of those tests. At that 
point, the following interchange occurred: 
JUDGE CROFT: Well, let's get the tests into 
evidence first, Mr. Sykes. 
MR. SYKES: I'd be happy to do that, Your 
Honor. 
JUDGE CROFT: Well lets do it first. That's 
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the proper way to do them. Can you identify 
those four reports by exhibit numbers? 
(T. D456-57) Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel had the various 
reports marked and identified, all of which were received without 
objection. It is clearly evident that the trial judge was not 
"scolding" counsel, but was properly requiring him to follow 
appropriate procedures prior to questioning the witness concerning 
the contents of the exhibits. 
DEMEANOR OF THE TRIAL JUDGE 
Plaintiff contends he was prejudiced by reason of the non-
verbal conduct, including facial expressions, tone of voice, 
sighs and body language. Plaintiff has moved this court to 
supplement the record with four affidavits in support of this 
contention. Defendants have filed herein their response to that 
motion opposing the inclusion of these affidavits as part of the 
record. A copy of Defendant's response is annexed to this brief 
as Appendix C, and the contents thereof are incorporated herein. 
Plaintiff made no objection during the course of the trial 
to any non-verbal conduct of the trial judge; this claim was 
raised by plaintiff for the first time in his motion for a new 
trial. As was noted in the various authorities cited by defendants 
in their objection to the affidavits, an allegation of impropriety 
is not timely raised if it is first presented as a post-trial 
motion. State v. Barron, 465 S.W.2d 523 at 528 (Mo. 1971); Annau 
v. Schutte, 96 Idaho 704, 535 P.2d 1095 at 1101 (1975). In 
Barron, supra, the defendant in a criminal trial asserted in his 
motion for new trial that during the course of alibi testimony, 
the trial judge "placed his hands flat to the side of his head, 
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shook his head negatively once, leaned back and swiveled his 
chair 180° around." Noting that such conduct was not revealed by 
the record and that there was no other evidence of its occurrence 
save the verified motion for a new trial, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri stated: 
However, in any event, at the time appellant 
asserts this incident occurred, no objection 
was made and no relief was requested. The 
alleged action of the trial judge, if it 
occurred, would have the same effect as a 
remark or comment by the trial judge, and the 
rule is concisely stated in State v. McCullough, 
411 S.W.2d. 79, 81 as follows: 
If a party believes the remarks [by the 
court] may prejudice his cause, he 
should object immediately and afford the 
court an opportunity to correct any 
erroneous impression, and the issue is 
not timely presented when raised for the 
first time in a motion for a new trial. 
An accused in a criminal case cannot 
remain silent under the circumstances 
which appellant asserts here occurred, 
and thereby gamble on a favorable 
verdict by permitting the trial to go to 
conclusion without objection, and then 
contend for the first time in a motion 
for a new trial that reversible error 
occurred, [citing cases.] 
465 S.W.2d 523 at 528. 
This same rule was followed by the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton in Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain, Inc., 93 Wash. 2d 127, 
606 P.2d 1214 (1980). In that case, the defendant complained of 
"body language" by the trial court indicating disbelief during 
the testimony of a number of defendant's witnesses. Although the 
Washington court's statement in this regard appears in plaintiff's 
brief at page 30, plaintiff's editing removes the import of that 
statement as it relates to objections to the alleged misconduct. 
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The court's statement in full is as follows: 
While the report of proceedings does not 
reflect contemporaneous objections to such 
conduct, concurrent objection is not required. 
Seattle v. Harclaon, 56 Wash, 2d 596, 598, 
354 P.2d 928 (1960), concurring opinion of 
Finley J. Understandably, counsel may be 
reluctant to note such an objection, particu-
larly in the presence of the jury, and may 
elect not to object at all if the incidents 
are only occasional and minor. If, however, 
the occurrences are as frequent and marked as 
Crystal Mountain contends, counsel should 
object to the court's conduct. Failure to 
object denies the trial court an opportunity 
to mitigate the effect of its conduct on the 
jury, when such conduct has been inadvertent. 
Manifest error affecting a constitutional 
right may, of course, be raised at any time. 
RAP 2.5(a)(3). Timeliness of objection is 
not an issue in this case because the trial 
court was sufficiently apprised of the matter 
in the motion for mistrial. [The motion for 
new trial was made approximately one-half way 
through the trial]. 
606 P.2d at 1223 [emphasis added]. 
In this regard, plaintiff notes at page 28 through 30 of his 
brief an incident regarding the exhibit notebooks. As has been 
noted elsewhere in defendants' brief, the trial judge's statements 
were made to control the use of the exhibit book v/hich had some 
potential for abuse. In any event, when the dissatisfaction of 
plaintiff's counsel with the statement was called to the trial 
judge's attention, the trial judge modified his earlier ruling 
with regard to the use of the notebooks. Thus, in the single 
instance of which there is any indication that plaintiff's 
counsel objected to what he considered inappropriate conduct by 
the trial court, the trial judge immediately took steps to 
rectify any harm he may have done. 
Neither before nor after the off-the-record conference which 
occurred at the end of the third day of trial, did plaintiff's 
counsel make any objections to comments, either verbal or non-
verbal, by the trial judge. 
There is nothing in the record before this court which 
identifies any specific instances of non-verbal conduct or which 
specifically describes the conduct or which relates the conduct 
to any event in the written record. If such conduct was perceived, 
plaintiff's counsel should have interposed a timely objection 
thereto so that any perceived problem could be rectified and an 
appropriate record made. Instead, plaintiff first raised com-
plaints concerning the trial judge's conduct in a motion for a 
new trial. 
ARGUMENTS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY 
Plaintiff contends that the court permitted arguments in 
front of the jury with regard to the admissibility of evidence; 
plaintiff contends that permitting such argument amounted to a 
comment on the evidence because it indicated the court believed 
the plaintiff's evidence to be weak or unconvincing. 
Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, objections to evidence 
and arguments thereon almost always occur in the presence of the 
jury unless the argument, of necessity, would reveal the evidence 
sought to be excluded. Certainly, the jury cannot be inconven-
ienced by being asked to leave the courtroom each time an objection 
is made. Additionally, frequent and lengthy side-bar conferences 
leave the members of the jury with the feeling they are being 
excluded from the proceedings and that matters are being hidden 
from them. 
Defendants acknowledge that in certain instances arguments 
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with regard to the admissibility of the evidence did occur in the 
presence of the jury. Plaintiff asserts that during the course 
of such argument defendants' counsel "frequently interjected 
prejudicial information"; however, plaintiff does not specify 
what this alleged prejudicial information was. 
Plaintiff's brief cites five instances regarding argument 
over the use of learned treatises. In two of the instances (T. 
E560-64 and H20-23) the trial court properly precluded plaintiff's 
witnesses from reading portions of a learned treatise in the 
course of redirect examination because the witness had not relied 
upon the learned treaties in direct examination and it had not 
been called to the attention of the witness during cross-
examination. In the other three instances (T. F842, M32-36 and 
M49-54) plaintiff's counsel attempted to have portions of a 
learned treatise read to the jury without proper foundational 
questions. After such foundational questions were asked, the 
witnesses were allowed to read extensively from the learned 
treatises. 
Thus, in three of the five instances regarding learned 
treatises cited by plaintiff, the court permitted statements from 
learned treatises to be read to the jury. Defendants believe 
that this use of learned treatises was improper; if there was any 
prejudice engendered by the argument over the learned treatises, 
the prejudice was against defendants and not plaintiff. 
With regard to arguments on the admissibility of exhibits, 
plaintiff cites three instances. Objection to the admissibility 
of Exhibit 112 was made by defendants; the objection was overruled 
and the video film was shown. (T. E498-99) Exhibit 11, was a 
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photo album of plaintiff's life in Nigeria prior to the time he 
came to the United States. (T. G137) Defendants simply objected 
on the grounds of relevancy; plaintiff's counsel explained the 
types of pictures that were in the photograph album; the trial 
court reviewed the album and sustained the objection without 
lengthy argument. With regard to the admissibility of medical 
bills (T. J140-42) plaintiff sought to have his wife testify as 
to the medical bills incurred by plaintiff since the accident. 
The trial judge asked plaintiff to give copies of all of the 
bills to defendants1 counsel; defendants1 counsel stated that 
after review of the bills he would likely stipulate to the 
reasonableness of the bills, although not that they were incurred 
as a result of the accident. (T. M142) The transcript reflects 
that there was no argument at all, simply an interchange between 
the court and counsel. 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court allowed oral argumen-
tation over other important evidentiary points. Plaintiff cites 
as an example a disability evaluation by Dr. Gummow (T. F856-57) 
In those two pages of transcript, the only statements made by 
defendants1 counsel are as follows: 
MR. STEGALL: I think I am going to object 
to that as without foundation as to her 
expertise with regard to making any sort of 
vocational loss of income projections, Your 
Honor. 
(T. F856), and: 
MR. STEGALL: Then I would object to it as 
essentially relying on hearsay testimony that 
we don't have before the jury, that she is 
going outside of her area of expertise with 
regard to inquiring as to that type of income 
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information, description of occupation and 
the like. 
(T. F857). A review of other examples cited by plaintiff also 
reveal that defendants' counsel made a simple statement of his 
objection to the testimony. 
In many of the specific examples cited by plaintiff in his 
brief, the evidence in question was admitted. In the remaining 
examples, a review of the specific portions of the transcript 
reveals that little argumentation occurred and specific objections 
were made to the evidence in question. In fact, the portions of 
the transcript cited support the contention that any prejudice 
was to defendants and not to plaintiff. 
Additionally, the trial court issued the following specific 
instructions to the jury with regard to evidentiary rulings and 
statements by counsel. 
At times throughout the trial the court may 
have been called upon to rule whether or not 
certain offered evidence might be admitted. 
Whether offered evidence is admissible is 
purely a question of law. Neither the weight 
of the evidence, nor the credibility of the 
witness is involved in such rulings. You are 
not to consider nor conjecture upon evidence 
offered but not admitted, nor any evidence 
stricken out by the court. 
(R. 618) and, 
Statements of counsel made throughout the 
trial, are not evidence and should not be 
considered as such by you. 
(R. 620) 
There is no support in the record or transcript for plain-
tiff's contention that the court's permitting evidentiary objec-
tions to be made and argued in the presence of the jury somehow 
constituted a comment by the trial court on the evidence. As has 
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been shown, the trial court's rulings on those objections were as 
frequently in plaintiff's favor as against him. The trial court 
fully instructed the jury that neither rulings on the evidence 
nor statements by counsel were to be considered as evidence by 
the jury. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED LINCOLN 
CLARK, M.D., TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL. 
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW 
Rule 26(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
The party is under a duty seasonably to 
supplement his response with respect to any 
question directly addressed to . . . the 
identity of each person expected to be called 
as an expert witness at trial, the subject 
matter on which he is expected to testify, 
and the substance of his testimony. 
Rule 51(a)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows the trial 
court to grant a new trial based on "accident or surprise, which 
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against." 
The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether or 
not to exclude testimony or to grant a new trial based on an 
alleged surprise witness. Zakroff v. May, 8 Ariz. App. 101, 443 
P.2d 916 (1968); Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977) (a 
ruling on a motion for a new trial will be overturned only for a 
clear abuse of discretion); Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 
1981) (trial court's ruling on motion for new trial overturned 
only for clear abuse of discretion); Hadid v. Alexander, 55 Md. 
App. 344, 462 A.2d 1216 (1983) (trial judge has "large measure of 
discretion in applying sanctions for failure to comply"); 
Sturdivant v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 2 Conn. App. 103, 476 A.2d 
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1074 (1984) (decision to exclude testimony "rests within the 
sound discretion of the court"); Havas v. Haupt, 94 Nev. 1091, 
583 P.2d 1094 (1978) (decision to grant new trial lies within 
sound discretion of court). In reviewing a trial court's use of 
such discretion, the Utah Supreme Court noted that, "to overturn 
a trial court's ruling on a new trial requires a "clear transgres-
sion of 'reasonable bounds of discretion'", and no such transgres-
sion exists where there is evidence to support the ruling. 
Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d at 202. See also, Sturdivant v. Yale-New 
Haven Hospital, 476 A.2d at 1077. 
Beyond showing an abuse of discretion, the appellant must 
establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged "surprise" before 
the denial of a new trial will be overturned. See, Lembach, 639 
P.2d 197. See also, Acosta v. Superior Court, 146 Ariz. 437, 706 
P.2d 763 (1985); and Preston Motor Co., Inc. v. De S. Palomares, 
133 Ariz. 245, 650 P.2d 127 (1982). 
The policy behind such rules are that the disclosure of the 
witnesses permits "the opposing party to prepare an effective 
cross-examination." Hoover v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 
611 F.2d 1132, 1142 (5th Cir. 1980). See also, Sturdivant, 476 
A.2d 1074; and DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 433 F. 
Supp. (E.D. Pa. 1977) . Where this policy is not contravened, a 
so-called "surprise" witness has been allowed to testify. See, 
Havas, 583 P.2d 1094, ("surprise" was not found to exist where 
appellants could have taken action after notification to protect 
their interests); Zakroff v. May, 8 Ariz. App. 101 443 P.2d 916 
(1968) (testimony allowed where appellant was given opportunity 
to depose witness prior to testimony). See also, Macshara v. 
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Garfield, 20 Utah 2d 152, 434 P.2d 756 (1967), rev'd on other 
grounds, Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.3d 1328 (Utah 1979) (not 
abuse to permit testimony not disclosed at pretrial.) 
Where appellant opposes the testimony of a witness, he must 
object when the witness is called to testify. lf[W]e hold that, 
under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, a specific objection 
is required even where a pretrial motion is suppress has been 
made." State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983). 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff contends that Lincoln Clark, M.D., a psychiatrist 
called to testify on behalf of defendants, was a surprise witness 
whose testimony was prejudicial to plaintiff. 
Conduct by plaintiff himself which was perceived by an 
experienced psychiatrist as threatening caused Dr. Clark to 
initially withdraw as an expert witness. Plaintiff's own counsel 
apparently perceived the threat as real as he called Dr. Clark to 
warn him of possible violence from plaintiff in an incident where 
plaintiff, in fact, appeared at the office of plaintiff's counsel 
and banged on counsel's desk with a cane. After reassessing the 
risk to his personal safety, Dr. Clark concluded that he could 
appear as a witness. Plaintiff was informed that Dr. Clark would 
be a witness more than ten days prior to trial. Dr. Clark's 
testimony did not occur until February 13, 1987, twenty-two days 
after plaintiff's counsel had notice that he would appear. 
Plaintiff's motion in. limine to exclude Dr. Clark as a 
witness was heard by the trial judge on the Friday before trial, 
January 30, 1987. At that time, Judge Croft indicated that he 
was inclined to permit Dr. Clark to testify and stated: 
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[JUDGE CROFT]: I would say that if, during 
the course of the trial, you decide you want 
to call Dr. Clark then perhaps an opportunity 
for Mr. Sykes to interview him might be 
granted. 
MR. STEGALL: Okay. I would certainly be 
willing to inquire of Dr. Clark as to whether 
he could put together a written report prior 
to Monday or Tuesday. I don't know how 
feasible that is but I will certainly so 
inquire and if one can be prepared — 
JUDGE CROFT: One might say if he is going to 
testify then tell him we want a written 
report for the attorneys to have a look at. 
MR. SYKES: That's the least we should have, 
is a written report. 
JUDGE CROFT: So if you want to agree to try 
to get together to dictate a report and have 
it available to you Monday or Tuesday so you 
will both have it then I would say if you 
went to call him, why, I would permit him to 
do so. 
(T. Q49-50.) 
A copy of Dr. Clark's written report relating to his examina-
tion and evaluation of plaintiff was delivered to plaintiff's 
counsel on Wednesday, February 4, 1987, at 9:30 a.m. Plaintiff's 
counsel did not thereafter attempt to depose or interview Dr. 
Clark. No objection was made by plaintiff when Dr. Clark was 
called to testify on February 13, 1987. 
At trial, plaintiff's counsel conducted an able, aggressive 
and lengthy cross-examination of Dr. Clark. A review of the 
transcript (Vol. L) reveals the cross-examination fills nearly 
one hundred pages (compared to 44 pages for direct examination) 
and occupied substantially all of the afternoon session of 
February 13, 1987. During the course of cross-examination, 
plaintiff's counsel tested the credibility of the witness utilizing 
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Dr. Clark's transcribed testimony taken during the trial of 
another closed-head brain injury case in which both plaintiff's 
counsel and Dr. Clark were involved. 
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by the refusal of the trial 
court to exclude Dr. Clark as a witness. The witness's earlier 
withdrawal had been caused by plaintiff's own conduct. A seven 
page single-spaced typed report of the witness' examination and 
findings were furnished to plaintiff's counsel substantially in 
advance of the witness's testimony. Plaintiff's counsel had had 
the opportunity to test the demeanor, credentials and expertise 
of the witness in a prior legal proceeding. A cross-examination 
performed by plaintiff's counsel reveals counsel's own substantial 
expertise in the field of brain injury which permitted him to 
make a full and informative cross-examination of the witness. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING 
EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE ADMITTED BY PLAINTIFF, 
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW 
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of the party is affected. 
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, defines relevant evidence 
as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that "[a]11 
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relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided . . 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that evidence, 
although relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considera-
tions of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Rule 803(18), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that learned 
treatises are not excluded by the hearsay rule; learned treatises 
may be used as follows: 
To the extent called to the attention of an 
expert witness upon cross-examination or 
relied upon by him in direct examination, 
statements contained in published treatises, 
periodicals, or pamphlet on the subject of 
history of a medicine, or other science or 
art, established as a reliable authority by 
the testimony or admission of the witness or 
by other expert testimony or by judicial 
notice. If admitted, the statements may be 
read into evidence but may not be received as 
exhibits. 
Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that testimony in 
the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided 
by the trier-of-fact. 
A judgment will not be reversed for alleged error in the 
exclusion of evidence unless it appears in the record that the 
error was prejudicial. Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney 
Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1978). Where evidence is excluded by 
the trial court, any error which may have resulted from such 
exclusion is cured where the substance of the evidence is later 
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admitted through some other means. State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 
586 (Utah 1983). Even if a refusal to admit photographs was 
error, no prejudice resulted to defendant where the evidence was 
cumulative and could have added nothing to defendant's case. 
Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). 
ARGUMENT 
EXHIBIT 114—VIDEO TAPE OF CRASH 
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in refusing to 
admit a video tape of a crash sequence in which an automobile is 
driven into a wall at five, twenty-one and twenty-three miles per 
hour with the video tape showing the effects on dummys in the car 
including the dummy striking its head on the windshield. The 
video tape was reviewed by the court and counsel out of the 
presence of the jury. Defendants objected to the admission of 
the video tape upon the ground that the mechanism of the crash 
shown in the tape, a head-on striking of a fixed wall by an 
automobile, was substantially different than the mechanism 
involved in the accident in question. (T. C123-28) There was no 
evidence of any broken windshield on plaintiff's vehicle, and no 
evidence that the plaintiff struck his head on the windshield. 
The video tape was not specially made for this particular litiga-
tion to illustrate the particular circumstances involved in 
plaintiff's accident. In view of the substantial difference 
between the mechanism of the accident in question and the head-on 
wall collision portrayed in the video tape and the lack of 
evidence of plaintiff striking the windshield, admission of the 
evidence would have substantially prejudiced the defendants. 
Plaintiff was permitted to testify that he did strike his 
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head on the interior of the vehicle. Testimony was elicited from 
various treating physicians as to statements made by plaintiff to 
the physician regarding whether or not he hit his head on the 
interior of the vehicle and what was hit. Plaintiff's expert 
witness testified with regard to the effect of a sudden decelera-
tion on the occupants of a motor vehicle. Thus, substantial 
evidence was admitted with regard to plaintiff's claim that he 
struck his head on the interior of the vehicle. 
While the video tape did illustrate the effects of decelera-
tion on occupants of a vehicle, it did so in such a graphic form 
and under circumstances substantially different than those 
involved in the case at trial that the trial court properly 
refused to admit the evidence even for illustrative purposes. 
LEARNED TREATISES 
Plaintiff cites as error a refusal or reluctance of the 
trial court to permit the use of learned treatises during examina-
tion. While claiming "numerous occasions" plaintiff cites 
specifically only four instances. 
The example described by plaintiff as the "most egregious" 
occurred during rebuttal testimony by Dr. Linda Gummow. The 
transcript reflects that plaintiff's counsel initially attempted 
to have Dr. Gummow read from the learned treatises without any 
testimony that those treatises had been relied upon by her as 
part of her direct testimony. The transcript also reveals that 
the witness was being asked to read from the literature prior to 
authenticating it. Following objection by defendants, the trial 
court properly required that the witness first authenticate the 
treatises, then state that she had an opinion with regard to the 
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subject matter of those treatises and that she relied upon the 
treatises in formulating that opinion and then render her opinion 
before permitting her to read from the treatises. Thus, the "most 
egregious" example of the trial court's reluctance to admit 
statements contained in learned treatises was no more than the 
trial court properly requiring that appropriate foundational 
testimony be given before the statements were read to the jury. 
It should be further noted that Dr. Gummow read to the jury 
statements occupying most of ten pages of trial transcript. (T. 
M36-46) 
In the two specific examples cited by plaintiff with regard 
to the examination of Dr. Gerald Moress, (T. D444-45 and D452-53) 
plaintiff's witness was asked on redirect examination to authen-
ticate a learned treatise. In these instances, the witness had 
not relied upon the learned treatise in direct examination and 
was not cross examined upon it; apparently, plaintiff's counsel 
was intending to have the witness authenticate the text in 
anticipation of its use with other witnesses. Plaintiff's 
counsel did not attempt to authenticate the treatise during the 
course of direct testimony but waited until redirect examination 
to do so. The treatise in question was subsequently authenticated 
by another witness, Dr. Goka. (T. D475) 
In the third specific instance cited by plaintiff's counsel 
again attempted an inappropriate use of the learned treatise 
exception. In earlier testimony, Dr. Gummow testified that a 
treatise by Jeannette and Teasdale was a learned text in the 
field. A review of the transcript (T. D842-43) reveals that 
again plaintiff's counsel was attempting to have the witness read 
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from a learned treatise without foundational testimony that the 
treatise was relied upon by the expert in the giving of her 
direct testimony. Instead, plaintiff's counsel simply asked 
whether the learned treatise agreed with her and then asked her 
to read from the learned treatise. In fact, the testimony never 
did meet the foundational requirements for admissabilityf but the 
witness was still allowed to read from the treatise. 
EXCLUSION OF REBUTTAL WITNESSES 
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in excluding the 
testimony of two individuals, Dr. Joseph Johnson and Dr. Devra 
Garfinkle, both mathmatics instructors at the University of Utah 
who had plaintiff in their classes. After Dr. Johnson was 
identified, defendants' counsel objected to the witnesses as 
being improper on rebuttal. The trial judge requested a sidebar 
conference with counsel and then excused the jury. After the 
jury was excused, plaintiff's counsel made a proffer with regard 
to the two witnesses. The proffer was testimony from the two 
witnesses as to the grades plaintiff had received in their 
classes, their observations regarding plaintiff's ability to 
grasp mathmatical concepts, and the fact plaintiff had importuned 
them to raise his grades. These witnesses were being offered to 
rebut the testimony of Dr. Clark as to the time of the appearance 
of plaintiff's problems and the opinion of Dr. Cook that plaintiff 
was a malingerer. Defendants contended that the proffered 
testimony might have had some relevance to the presentation of 
the case in chief but that it was not proper rebuttal testimony. 
(T. M97-102) After hearing the proffered testimony, the trial 
judge determined that it was not truly rebuttal in nature and 
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that it should have been produced in plaintiff's case in chief, 
(T. M101-102) Additionally, the testimony was cumulative of 
substantial other testimony regarding the time of the appearance 
of plaintiff's claimed problems. 
EXCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S PLANS FOR THE FUTURE 
Plaintiff contends that it was error for the trial court not 
to allow plaintiff's wife, Elizabeth Onyeabor, to testify with 
regard to their plans for the future if there had been no accident. 
Defendants objected to the question upon the grounds that it 
called for speculation and that plaintiff was the proper person 
of which to ask the question. The objection was sustained (T. 
J142-43) Subsequently, Mr. Onyeabor was recalled to testify as to 
his future plans. The court permited testimony with regard to 
plaintiff's future plans for work and school; the court sustained 
defendants' various objections to questions as to what plaintiff 
believed his earnings might have been but for the accident. The 
court did permit plaintiff to testify as to the types of jobs he 
had intended to obtain during the two years following the accident 
and his various school plans. (T. M3-7) 
OPINION ON FAULT 
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in refusing to 
permit Deputy Leavitt to render an opinion as to who was "at 
fault" in causing the accident. The transcript reveals plaintiff's 
counsel first asked the witness as to his familiarity with the 
traffic rules and regulations in force in the county and state 
and whether it was his job to enforce those rules and regulation; 
the witness was then asked "what is the proper thing to do in a 
situation where an individual is positioned such as Mrs. Bates." 
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Defendants objected to the question within the context of the 
witness1 duty to enforcement of traffic regulations as an attempt 
to admit into a civil proceeding evidence of a traffic violation. 
The objection was sustained on the basis that the question was 
improper, (T. A47-48) Plaintiff's counsel then asked the 
witness "tell us what you believed to have happened from that 
moment [Bates exiting driveway] forward." Deputy Leavitt testified 
as follows: 
Well, I believe that as she started to exit 
the parking lot that she saw a large van or 
truck-type vehicle but that she could not see 
any other vehicles that could have been to 
the side of that vehicle and as she pulled 
out pulled out in front of the van and 
attempted to move all the way across the 
roadway into the left-turn lane she didn't 
see the vehicle that collided with her, 
(T. A48-50) After the jury was excused for the evening, plain-
tiff's counsel made a proffer with regard to allowing Deputy 
Leavitt to testify as to who was "at fault". (T. A59-62) The 
trial judge sustained defendants' objection to the proffer 
stating that the officer had already testified as to the cause of 
the accident including the conduct of defendant Bates which 
resulted in the collision. (T. A61-62) Obviously, the concern 
of the trial judge was with the form of the question and the use 
of the term "at fault". The officer was permitted to respond to 
the substance of the question. Additionally, the next day on 
direct examination, Deputy Leavitt was permitted to testify as to 
the "cause" of the accident. (T. C69) Clearly, the substance of 
the testimony sought to be admitted by plaintiff was admitted. 
EXHIBIT 7 5-A PURCHASE ORDER 
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in refusing to 
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admit exhibit 75, a purchase order purportedly issued by Chuk's 
Group of Companies to Gillis Continental Enterprises dated March 
21, 1981. It was offered "as illustrative of a contract that he 
had of some substance in Nigeria of his business." (T. G152) 
Defendant's objection to the admission of the exhibit on grounds 
of irrelevance was sustained. 
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by the refusal to admit the 
purchase order as substantial evidence was given by plaintiff, by 
plaintiff's sister and by plaintiff's acquaintances regarding 
plaintiff's business in Nigeria and his income therefrom. A 
purchase order for surface materials to be delivered in 1981, 
without more, would not add anything to evidence which was 
received by the court. For this reason, the evidence was properly 
excluded as irrelevant under Rule 410, Utah Rules of Evidence, or 
as a needless presentation of cumulative evidence under Rule 403. 
POINT IV 




: REGARD TO THE DUTIES OF 
DEFENDANT AS 








', OF EACH 
PARTY WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW 
In Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985), the trial 
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment in an 
action involving a tenant's claim for personal injuries allegedly 
resulting from the negligence of the landlord and the builder of 
the apartment building. From the granting of the motion for 
summary judgment, plaintiff appealed. In reversing the trial 
court the Supreme Court stated that "summary judgment should be 
granted with great caution in negligence cases." Ld. at 725. 
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The reasoning of the court was stated as follows: 
In the days when contributory negligence was 
an absolute defense in a negligence actionr 
summary judgment could be used to dispose of 
negligence actions without depriving a 
plaintiff of his right to a trial on the 
merits. Now, however, contributory negligence 
is not an absolute defense, and summary 
judgment is rarely an appropriate remedy for 
resolving negligence actions. 
Id. at 728. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46(1) (1953), provides: 
No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed 
greater than is reasonable and prudent under 
the conditions and having regard to the 
actual and potential hazards then existing. 
Consistent with the foregoing, every person 
shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed 
when approaching and crossing an intersection 
or railroad grade crossing, when approaching 
or going around a curve, when approaching a 
hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or 
winding roadway, and when special hazards 
exist with respect to pedestrians or other 
traffic or by reason of whether or highway 
conditions. 
Lodder v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., 259 P.2d 589 (Utah 
1953), was an action for personal injuries arising out of a 
collision between a train and an automobile in which plaintiff 
was riding as a passenger. Defendants argued on appeal that 
under the evidence and as a matter of law the sole proximate 
cause of the collision was the negligence of the automobile 
driver. Defendants claimed that the driver violated § 41-6-46(1) 
by driving at a speed greater than was "reasonable and prudent 
under the conditions having regard to actual or potential hazards 
then existing." In refusing to overrule the jury's finding that 
defendant's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the 
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collision, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
That there are cases where such a holding is 
proper is clear, the statute does not fix any 
definite speed at which a driver may drive. 
It merely requires that the speed be reason-
able and prudent and appropriate under the 
existing conditions and surrounding circum-
stances. The test which it provides is very 
similar to the common law test of negligence. 
What rate of speed constitutes negligence or 
violation of this statute under the condi-
tions shown by the evidence is a matter about 
which there is room for reasonable disagree-
ment; such being the case, a jury question is 
presented. . . . Under the circumstances here 
shown, a finding that the driver was free 
from negligence was not unreasonable; a jury 
question was therefore presented and we 
cannot overrule the jury's conclusion. 
Id. at 592-93 [emphasis added]. 
ARGUMENT 
Although plaintiff's stated contention is that the trial 
court gave erroneous jury instructions, it is obvious from 
plaintiff's argument that plaintiff contends the trial court 
should have directed a verdict on the liability issue. 
Motions for summary judgment and for directed verdict in 
favor of a party at the close of evidence in a jury trial are 
substantially the same. Both require the trial court to say that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried by the 
jury and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. The same cautions expressed by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Williams v. Melby, supra, with regard to a summary judgment are 
applicable to a directed verdict. 
As appears from the Statement of Facts and the record, there 
was substantial conflict in the evidence as to the circumstances 
of the accident, including the location and speed of the two 
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vehicles prior to impact, the location, speed and actions of the 
white van or truck next to plaintiff's vehicle, and the location 
of the vehicles after impact. It would have been improper for 
the trial court to have substituted its judgment for that of the 
jury in resolving the conflicting evidence with regard to the 
facts and circumstances of the accident. 
The road on which plaintiff was traveling was busy and 
heavily traveled with several shopping centers and a school 
nearby. Plaintiff was approaching the semaphore controlled 
intersection at Fort Union Boulevard. Two driveways from a 
shopping center parking lot were in the immediate vicinity of the 
intersection. A large van or truck was traveling beside or 
slightly ahead of plaintiff which obscured his vision to the 
right front and right. There was other traffic behind him and 
oncoming traffic south-bound on 900 East. Plaintiff was travel-
ing from a construction site at 8000 South and 100 East to his 
home at approximately 900 East and 4400 South for lunch during 
his lunch hour; it may be inferred that plaintiff was in a hurry. 
Under these circumstances, the jury could appropriately 
determine a reasonable person would have slowed his vehicle in 
anticipation of actual or potential hazards. The law imposed 
upon plaintiff certain duties with regard to the operation of his 
vehicle; those duties are accurately set forth in the court's 
Instruction 21: 
To use reasonable care to keep a lookout for 
other vehicles, persons, or other conditions 
reasonably to be anticipated, and the duty to 
keep a lookout includes the duty to see and 
heed that which is plain to be seen. 
To drive at such a speed as was safe, reason-
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able and prudent under the conditions and 
circumstances having due regard for the 
width, surface and condition of the highway, 
the flow of other traffic thereon, then 
existing. Consistent therewith, our law 
provides that every person shall drive at a 
safe and appropriate speed when approaching 
an intersection, and when special hazards 
exist with respect to other traffic, or by 
reason of highway conditions. 
(R. 640) 
Given the conflict within the evidence presented to the jury 
and the duties imposed upon the operators of motor vehicles, the 
issue of the negligence of the parties and the apportionment of 
such negligence between the parties required that the issue be 
submitted to the jury. 
In its special verdict, the jury clearly considered defendant 
Bates to have been the substantial contributor in causing the 
accident and attributed seventy-five percent of the fault to her. 
However, the jury also determined that plaintiff failed to see 
and heed an actual or potential hazard or operated his vehicle at 
a speed which was not safe, reasonable and prudent under the 
conditions and circumstances and attributed twenty-five percent 
of the fault to him. 
The trial court issued a proper instruction on the concept 
of proximate cause in Instruction 16 (R. 633). The jury found 
plaintiff's negligence to have been a proximate cause of the 
accident and his injuries. (R. 659). 
It should be noted that the trial court also included 
in its charge to the jury an instruction that the mere occurrence 
of an accident does not support an inference of negligence (R. 
628) and a "sudden peril" instruction (R. 632). Both of these 
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instructions were consistent with plaintiff's arguments on 
liability, 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, AN ADDITUR. 
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW 
The trial judge, in granting or denying a motion for new 
trial, has broad latitude. The disposition will not be over-
turned on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial 
judge. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 
1984); Goodard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984). Rulings on 
motions for new trial are addressed to the sound discretion of 
the trial court. Orders granting or denying motions for a new 
trial will not be reversed on appeal unless there has been a 
manifest abuse of discretion. Schmit v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981), (citing Smith v. Shreeve, 
551 P.2d 1261 (Utah 1976); Lee v. Howes, 548 P.2d 619 (Utah 
1976); Pollesche v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 497 P.2d 236 
(1972) . 
In Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982), the Utah 
Supreme Court specifically addressed its standard of review of 
motions for new trial. In an action for personal injuries 
arising out of a motor vehicle accident the trial court denied 
defendant's motion for new trial upon the condition that the 
plaintiff accept a remittitur in the amount of $15,000. Both 
parties appealed. With regard to the Supreme Court's review of 
motions for new trial, the court stated: 
Under Rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of 
CO 
Civil Procedure, a trial court may grant a 
new trial on the ground of "[i]nsufficiency 
of the evidence to justify the verdict . . .." 
The trial judge has broad latitude in 
granting or denying a motion for new trial, 
and will not be overturned on appeal absent 
an abuse of discretion. But when the issue 
is alleged insufficiency of evidence, the 
decisions of this Court have established a 
different standard for our review of the 
trial court's decisions on motions for new 
trial, depending on whether the court has 
denied the motion or granted it. 
When the trial court has denied the motion 
for new trial, its decision will be sustained 
on appeal if there was "an evidentiary basis 
for the jury's decision . . .." The trial 
court's denial of a motion for new trial will 
be reversed only if "the evidence to support 
the verdict is completely lacking or was so 
slight and unconvincing as to make the 
verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." 
[Citing cases.] 
657 P.2d at 731-32. 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF'S BACK INJURY 
As appears from defendant's Statement of Facts relating to 
damages, the evidence was in dispute with regard to the nature 
and extent of plaintiff's claimed back injury and the cause of 
that injury. 
In its Interrogatory 6, the jury made the following findings 
with regard to the damages proximately resulting from the collision 
in question: 
1. General Damages (pain and 
suffering, past and future.) $ 4,000.00 
2. Special Damages 
a. Medical expenses to date $ 1,850.00 
b. Lost earnings to date $ 4,500.00 
5. Present Value of Future 
Special Damages: 
a. Medical and psychotherapy $ 5,000.00 
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b. Lost future earnings $ 1,500.00 
Total Damages $16,850.00 
(R. 663.) 
It would appear from the damages awarded that the jury 
believed plaintiff had suffered some back injury. However, the 
jury could certainly have determined from the testimony of Dr. 
Spencer and Dr. Houts and from the CT scans and the evidence 
regarding plaintiff's physical activities that plaintiff's 
complaints resulted from a pre-existing bulging disc which was 
aggravated by the automobile accident but which had resolved 
itself by September 20, 1984. The jury also could have concluded 
that many of the subsequent problems with plaintiff's back 
resulted from a reinjury during a karate class. This is particu-
larly so in view of the letter written by Dr. Houts to Farmer's 
Insurance Group (plaintiff's insurance carrier) (Exh. 136) in 
which Dr. Houts stated, "The patient now tells me that three 
months ago in karate class he was doing jumps and kicks when he 
suddenly hurt his back again." Plaintiff was angry at Dr. Houts 
concerning that letter and came to the doctor's office so loud 
and angry that he was asked to leave. (T. G17; Exh. 32.) For 
this reason, the jury's damage award to the extent it related to 
the back injury was justified by the evidence and cannot be 
considered to have resulted from passion or prejudice. 
Defendants' counsel takes exception to the suggestion by 
plaintiff in his brief that this Court should take judicial 
notice of the settlement value of generic herniated disc cases. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLOSED-HEAD BRAIN INJURY 
Plaintiff's claim of closed-head brain injury was substan-
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tially disputed by the evidence. Essentially, plaintiff claimed 
that in the collision his automobile was thrown onto and off of 
the median causing him to strike his head on the interior of the 
vehicle. 
On direct examination Lincoln Clark, M.D., testified as to 
the best predictors of a closed-head brain injury: 
A The greatest amount of data on this, and 
the features that are the brightest 
value in predicting what the likely 
consequences are going to be, is first 
of all the evidence that there was a 
significant blow delivered to the head. 
Number two, the loss of consciousness 
that occurs from the injury. Number 
three how much memory is lost for events 
prior to the accident. And finally how 
much loss of memory after the accident. 
That's post-traumatic amnesia and the 
first is called retrograde amnesia. 
(T. L77-78.) 
As appears from defendants' Statement of Facts, there was 
substantial evidence that plaintiff did not suffer any blow, let 
alone a significant blow, to his head. There was no evidence of 
loss of consciousness. Plaintiff's own testimony concerning the 
accident did not indicate any loss of memory for events prior to 
the accident and no apparent loss of memory after the accident. 
Based upon his examination of all of plaintiff's medical records 
of voluminous psychological test results and his examination of 
the plaintiff, Dr. Clark rendered his opinion that plaintiff had 
not suffered a closed-head brain injury. (T. L101-102) Addition-
ally, Dr. Clark testified as to a number of factors in plaintiff's 
life which would be expected to lead to many of the personal, 
marital, school and work problems of which plaintiff complained. 
(T. L103-104) Dr. Clark also explained in some detail the 
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improbability of and lack of scientific evidence to support the 
notion that an individual could suffer a brain injury without a 
direct blow to the head. (T. L84-87) This theory, called axonal 
shearing, (a notion similar to a whiplash injury of the brain) 
had been a theory put forward by plaintifffs experts to explain 
how plaintiff could have suffered an injury to his brain without 
any direct blow to it. 
Certainly, plaintiff had numerous expert witnesses testify 
that in their opinion plaintiff had suffered a closed-head brain 
injury. The so-called "neuropsychological" testimony was based 
upon plaintiff's performance on various psychologiccil tests which 
occurred after the accident; however, there was no such testing, 
or similar testing, prior to the accident with which to compare 
the post-accident test results. The validity of such testing as 
a method to diagnose brain injury was disputed by defense witness 
Dr. Robert Cook (T. Klll-13). 
There was substantial evidence from which the jury concluded 
that the plaintiff did not suffer a blow to his head and did not 
suffer a closed-head brain injury. In view of the substantial 
evidence supporting the jury's damage award, there is no basis to 
believe that the verdict resulted from any passion or prejudice 
or any claim of improper conduct by the trial judge. 
Again, defendants1 counsel takes strong exception to plain-
tiff's improper inclusion in his brief of information concerning 
costs incurred by him to try the case and take this appeal, and 
of any settlement offers that may have been made to the plaintiff 
prior to trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff received a full and fair trial of his personal 
injury claims. The verdict of the jury and the denial by the 
trial court of plaintiff's motion for new trial or additur should 
be affirmed. 
DATED this cM day of September, 1988. 
GUSTIN, GREEN, STE£ALL & LIAPIS 
William A. Stegall^ 
Attorneys for Re spond\nt(3 
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I caused to be delivered, by hand, four true and correct copies 
of the Brief of Respondents, to: 
Robert B. Sykes 
Attorney at Law 
311 South State Street, Suite 240 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 
64 
A P P E N D I X 
INDEX TO APPENDIX 
APPENDIX NO. DOCUMENT NAME 
A Investigating Officer's Report (Exh. 5) 
B Copy of photograph of plaintiff's vehicle 
(Exh. 2A) 
C Respondent's Response to Appellant's Motion 
to Supplement Record on Appeal 
D Testimony of Patrick Chukwo (T. D290-95) 
E Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 59(a) (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 803(18), Utah Rules of Evidence 
APPENDIX A 
S» 0 ( » M 
»tv i s ; 
o r n i c u r u inn 
INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENT 
ffi DATE OF ACCIDENT 
V c - Ca» *e« 
WEE* 
PLACE WHERE 
ACCIDENT OCCURRED County *<J G\> 
m M'UTAR* TIME J I L 
City Of town. 
»t accident *as ogtsifle d y •trntts 
md»caie distance tro»"> r«iv i»mn« of nearest town_ 
Ncnr S E A 
C"1y 0' (Own 
ROAD ON WHICH 
ACCIDENT OCCURRED . foot. 
m 6'vf nam* o< sfee* o* htg**a> numr*-
1 • AT l*S INTERSECTION W T H -
2 - IF NOT AT INTERSECTION. 
Name ot intersecting st»«e o* h 9 ^ as nynpe' 
N01- S E w 
. fee- " ~ " o» _ 
«e o- h gv as nynpe' 
N 3 - * 5 ! v.-
00 NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE 
C D 
STATE/iOCAfc> 
Nea*es» in»e*section. suee* house n: lancna'* 
. BE SURE TO COMPLETE IF ROAD HAS MILEPOSTS C TraffKGOae'M C Nor T j » « * Arcfltnt 
ACCIDENT SEVERITY 
1 • Damage on»y 
2 • Posstfc? '"lu'y 
3 • Non-mcaoacitatijn 
4 • incapaciiai I Q 
5 • Fata' 
0 
FIRST E V E N T 
SUBSEQUENT EVENT 
DDD> 
Pe'estnan 6 • Ftxec obiect 
Oine motor venule 7 0*",» opted 
Tra«- 8 Ovenj^ca on road 
B»cyc»e 9 Ran : • fUa3 
Anima* 10 • Oine non-co'iisto* 
If accident involved more thin 2 motor vehicles, 
pedestrian, bicycle, animal, fixed object 






" — ^^m l M ' ' , «# J M l M M e 
/9f31 /fauU AJbL 
*%• Sitrk#«e l u ' F h S E T e a " T M F r 
Boc> St>'« '>r>e Code 
eft*/I i 
Commerce Vehicle (Reg 12 000 lt>« or morej 
intestate r~> Intrastate n 
Description ol carg? Reg we gM o* vehicle 
Accident Re ease St»cve* • 
Vehicle <oenttticatiO" Numser 
* * i * ^A**-'}* ^A$'M. I Number, si ^% ^ - ^ - » I *ans flamagec 
I I I I .1 n o 
Cos* o' Repair 
Removal Authority 1 • Ow^f 
2 Driver 
3 • Otter 
4 Occuoan1 
5 O^e-











1 • PuDltC 
1 • Com I 
3 • None 
4 un*r. 
1|C'» 
Tyoe ICause] ^u 
Tn'oug^ w -^.a' 
a-ea ejecttC 
5
 y 4 
State 
OCCUPANTS 
font Cente' _ 
Soe^y Res-«ction« 




ear Cenie* 1„ 






. Add'ess _ 
. AdC'JSS _ 
fthlcK 
12 
ase Slicke' • I i»CENSE V**Z* Twont? I Statt \)uf 
Code 
-JL-
Commercia Venic»e (R«; 12 000 IDs or more) 
interstate O intrastate Q 
Descipnon ot ca-gc Reg *«ignt o* ye^ 
ciotni Rele  l er t  
PLATE 
tNFO VA o,k> 
^sDosjpd t^' Venide nic»e !dji^ tt,icatiO''Numse' ^?y^CTtv'*L!0 ur-A ^^A io nyf^l 
tLT^/?/)75 C7J- Pans damaged Ml I I UJL 8 1 0 
^ c W ^ 
Cos' ot Repair 
,ov oi nepair > ^ 
Removal Authority 1 • Ov*ne* 
2 - 0r«>re' 
3 - Oliver 
4 • Occupant 
5 • Otner 
6 • N/A 
KIVtA 
u
^^?7i&ruuJ? 71- OMUIA-^A 
*ffiniWd4iatf. -ft j . f l biree* ui) y,rt m 
y5?&.?4?<_-?£<$<fi vu$ 




1 • Pueiic 
2 • Com. 
3 • None 
4 - Unkn 
nrtr | 
:tnse mr\ /V67£2i/i?z- 0 1 • tegular ] - Motorcycle TYP* Z • Cnaufleur 4 • Re*tncte<J Date of Sirtu l\£\/\^\S\<? Age Se« Sate £QUIC In/uTr Type 1 Cause] Area Through what a ti eie:ied? 
State Specity Restrtctio^S 
CUPANTS. 
* Center _ 
URtght 
J2L Month Oa, mH + E 
«-f j PLAINTIFF'S 







. Address . 
. Address „ 
.Address . 
K 
KINO OF LOCALITY 
Manufacturing or 
industrial 
Shopping or busine 
Residential 
School 
Firms and Fields 
Open Country 
0 ROAD SURFACE 
Dry 1 
2 
3 • Muddy Slippery 
4 - Snowy Skppary 
5 - »cy 
0 LIGHT CONDITION f - Daylight 
2 • Dawn or dusk 
3 • Dark-no street 
lights 
4 • Dark-street lights 
0 WEATHER 
1 • Clear o^jt jyj 
2 • Raining 
3 - Snowing 
4 - Fog 
5 Oust 









7 • RR gates or signal 
8 • Specify other 
9 • No control present 
(Z) ROAD CHARACTER 
1 • Straighfievel 
2 • Straight grade 
3 • Straight-hidcrest 
4 • Curve-level 
5 - Curve-grade 




L U N I M I b U I I N U U H t U M S I A N L t O 
ORlVER 1 DRIVER 2 
Driver 
1 2 
00 O D DM not ctnvibule 
Ot C G Spew too fast 
02 O G Failed to yield right of way 
03 Q D Drove left of center 
04 O O Improper overtaking 
05 G G Passed stop sign 
06 G O Disregarded tr»tt*c signal 
07 G G Followed too closely 
08 C C Made improper turn 













G Had b«en drinking 







G Improper parking 
C Improper lookout 
G Failed to sig.^ a? 
G Other Improper driving 
Driver 
1 2 
19 G G Brakes defective 
20 O G Headitgnts insufficient* 
or out 
21 D G Headlights glaring 
22 D O Other lights or reliectoi 
delecitve 
23 G O Steeong mechanism 
defective 
24 G C Tires detective 
25 G C \rVmdshie«J not c»tir 
26 G G Other defective condition 
of vehic'e 
27 a G Hit and Run 
30 C C Non coupon (Fire) 
31 G O Collision (F»e) 
40 G O Stolen 
m 
Veh 2 0 
DIRECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
D I R E C T I O N PRIOR 
T O A C C I D E N T 
1 • N 
2 S 
3 • I 
4 - W 
5 • N/A 
1 • No Test 
2 • Blood 
3 • Breath 
4 - Other 
5 • Unknown 
6 - Refused 
7 - Post Mortem 
ALCOHOL VEST RESULTS 
Veh i Veh 2 Ped 
• • • 
COLLISION TYPE 







DIAGRAM WHAT HAPPENED BELOW 
/45" 
DESCRIBE WHAT HAPPENED 
(Refer to Vehicles Oy Number) _ 
-7/^s-s 
I 
Drrver intent pi tor to accident 
Dtrver 
52. EZIi 
01 Go straight ahead 
02 Overtake 
03 Make right turn y^ 
04 Make let turn /JLZl^/i 
05 Make U turn ^ * 
06 Slow or stop 
07 Start m traffic lane 
08 Start from parked 
position 
09 Back 
10 Remain stopped 
m traffic lane 
11 Regain parked 
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OF NORTH 
OH Travel Speeds 
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Posted Speeds 
;&C€Lityy0^&L T<ti \tft*fO 
WITNESSES 
N a m e _ _ 
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~flMP 6JP/M&4, , Address. 
.Address. 
> FIRST AI0 AQMiNiSTERED BY EMS REPORT NO 
1 • Policeman 6 - Private Individual 
2 Fireman 7 • Hospital 
3 • AmDuiance Personnel 8 • Helicopter Personnel 
4 • Paramedics 9 • None Administered 
5 • Doctor 0 • Unknown 
INJURED TAKEN BY INJURED TAKEN TO 
EMS REPORT NO 
• 
1 • AmDuiance Private 
2 • Ambulance ^DhCt 
3 - Paramedics 
4 • Private Vehicle 








Date Notified of Accident 
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SP^KSf nr uUL£RMftTiQN 
£"icer V scer.e3^ V ^ 'm" «*ta:ted station etc )y 
/ J M v r \ ^ \ * r r r y ^ « Scene 
investigation of accident 
cor.piejeo at 
St "'"*' cc-tacte  ) *
f \ n \ l W * \ of I I the same pay |
 m J . day following 
PHO'OIS) T4 
El;-
:rT$/^w <&6^ „„ Xj^m^^i ^^4^r- JZ 
Name. . Charge. 
Other action taken 
SIGN HERE. 
0M.cef < 'i^ a/o nant dw'Hzt Sooe'v^o' *oo fo*i ' y^o-f ^a k l l / . ^b 





N A M * 
ADDHI3S 
IU 
< LOCATION OF ACCID1NT 
STATEMENT 
(Motor VchlcU Colli.Ion) 
6//s-/fV HOUR OF ACCIDfNT / .' I'D f>rh 
?/y- fhtnu.^ /-cx*<? -&rr/ s C C • g<X 
TILIPHONE 
7 / o S " j~^-*#r ^ o o €.*.J?>- C 
Describe what you saw 
CO 
/f- z? si* n A. -/<• ^  «JU££ -ft^JL J-^-~— ° ^ ' <f^ QA.^ nf 
A n*i ^ w ^ o ^ 
_ ^ _ , — , _ ^ — _ _ — — . ^ . — 
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Describe what you saw 
4h€ tear-
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William A. Stegall, Jr. USB# A3093 
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 53 2-6996 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
OOoOooo 
EMMANUEL N. ONYEABOR, : 
: RESPONDENTS' RESPONSE TO 
Appellant, : APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
: SUPPLEMENT RECORD ON APPEAL 
vs. : 
: Case No. 87-0265-CA 
PRO ROOFING, INC., a Utah : 
corporation, and PAM BATES, : 
Respondents. : 
oooOooo 
Respondents Pro Roofing and Pam Bates respond to the 
appellant's motion to supplement record on appeal as follows: 
AFFIDAVITS REGARDING "NON-VERBAL CONDUCT" 
Appellant seeks to include in the record before this 
court affidavits of four individuals which affidavits purport to 
describe the conduct of the trial judge, the Honorable Bryant H. 
Croft, during the course of trial. The affidavits are given by 
Brian Burns and Linda Gummow, individuals who treated appellant 
and testified on his behalf at trial, Robert Jinks, a law clerk 
employed by appellant's attorney, and Kay Nebeker, appellant's 
guardian ad litem. 
It would be improper for this Cour*- to permit appellant 
to include these affidavits in the record on appeal for the 
following reasons: 
1. The non-verbal conduct complained of by 
appellant was not the subject of objection during the course 
of trial. 
(a). An allegation of impropriety is not timely 
raised if it is first presented at a post-trial motion. 
State v. Barron, 465 S.W.2d 523 at 528 (Mo. 1971); 
Annau v. Schutte, 96 Idaho 704, 535 P.2d 1095 at 1101 
(1975) . 
(b). Regardless of whether it is made contempor-
aneously or not, an objection to court impropriety 
should be raised during trial to allow the court to 
correct any inadvertent impressions given. Id.; 
Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain, Inc., 93 Wash.2d 127, 
606 P.2d 1214 at 1223 (1980); Butler v. United States, 
188 F.2d 24 at 27 (D.C. Cir 1951). 
(c). Objection to impropriety is necessary to 
preserve an accurate record of the complained of 
conduct for review. Butler, 188 F.2d 24 at 27; see 
also, People v. Maes, 607 P.2d 1028 at 1032 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1980) . 
2. The proffered affidavits are not part of the 
official record. 
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(a) Appellate review must be based upon the 
record before the trial court. Reliable Furniture Co. 
v. Fidelity and Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, 14 Utah 2d 
169, 380 P.2d 135 (1963); Petro v. State, 383 N.W.2d 
323 at 324 (Ind. 1978); Flick v. Van Tassell, 547 P.2d 
204 (Utah 1976); and Corbett v. Corbett, 24 Utah 2d 
378, 472 P.2d 430 at 433 (1970). 
(b) The presumption of regularity in the proceed-
ings can only be overcome by record evidence. State v. 
Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 at 1267 (Utah 1982); and Wood v. 
Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255 at 1257 (Utah 1984). 
(c) Affidavits are not effective in curing 
deficiencies of the record. City of Tucson v. Rvelas, 
19 Ariz. App. 530, 508 P.2d 1174 at 1176 (1973); State 
v. Hodges, 103 Idaho 765, 653 P.2d 1177 at 1178 (1982); 
Linton v. Maver-Never Meat Packers, 71 N.M. 305, 378 
P.2d 126 at 128 (1963); Annau. 
3. Neither these affidavits, nor similar affi-
davits, were submitted to the trial court during post-trial 
motions filed by appellant and are therefore now intimely. 
In Reliable Furniture Co., 380 P.2d 135, the Utah Supreme 
Court refused to consider four depositions which had not 
been previously presented to the trial court. 
4. The affidavits proffered by appellant are 
insufficient to establish court impropriety as the affiants' 
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statements concerning the alleged misconduct are vague and 
general, and they do not set forth specific examples of the 
alleged improprieties. Petro v. State, 383 N.E.2d 323. 
5. The statements contained in the affidavits 
are not sufficient to be used as evidence in a judicial 
proceeding as they are completely conclusory in nature, are 
without proper foundation and largely express affiants' 
opinions as to the alleged judicial conduct and its effect 
upon members of the jury. State v. Snyder, 88 Idaho 479, 
401 P.2d 548 at 550 (1965); People v. Thompson, 43 P.2d 600 
at 604 (Calif. 1935); People v. Merrill, 231 P.2d 573 at 581 
(Calif. 1951); Utah Rules of Evidence 701 (1983). 
6. Additionally, the affidavits include inadmis-
sible hearsay and comment on verbal expressions by the 
court. Utah Rules of Evidence 802 (1983) ; People v. Merrill, 
231 P.2d 573, 581. 
7. Even assuming improper conduct on the part of 
the court, any prejudice committed was alleviated by the 
court's instructions to the jury that the jury alone was the 
trier of fact and that any conduct by the court or counsel 
during trial was to be disregarded. 
8. Regardless of the admittance of the affidavits 
the appellant must prove that he was prejudiced by the 
alleged judicial conduct; the mere possibility or prejudice 
is not enough. Ettus v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 233 
Kan. 555, 665 P.2d 730 at 739 (1983). 
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CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN COUNSEL 
Appellant also seeks to supplement the record by 
including three letters from respondents* counsel to appellants 
counsel sent in December and January preceding the February 1987 
trial. 
Appellant asserts this correspondence supports his 
claim that Dr. Lincoln Clark was a "surprise witness". 
As is noted in appellant's memorandum, the testimony of 
Dr. Clark, which was eventually given on February 13, 1987, the 
tenth day of trial, was the subject of a motion _in limine by 
appellant prior the commencement of trial. The argument that Dr. 
Clark was a "surprise witness" was also made by appellant in 
connection with his post-trial motions. 
At no time during the proceedings before the trial 
court did appellant seek to introduce correspondence between 
counsel as part of the record for the consideration of the trial 
court. 
Without conceding in any way that Dr. Clark was either 
a "surprise witness" or that the correspondence in any way is 
relevant to the issue, it would be improper for this Court to 
consider on appeal documents which were never part of the record 
or subject to the consideration of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellant's motion to 
supplement the record herein with affidavits and copies of 
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correspondence between counsel should be denied. 
DATED this /^ day of July, 1988. 
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS 
William A. StSgfall, 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this / S ^ day of July, 1988, I 
caused to be delivered, by hand, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument to: 
Robert B. Sykes 
M. Gale Lemmon 
Attorneys at Law 
311 South State Street, Suite 240 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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APPENDIX D 
! THE PART OF MR. ONYEABOR? 
2 A PRIOR TO--
3 Q PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT. 
4 A I NEVER SEEN SUCH BECAUSE HE IS A GUY THAT ALWAYS 
5 APPRECIATE WHATEVER I DO TO HIM. 
6 Q IN ALL OF THE YEARS YOU KNEW HIM IN NIGERIA — 
7 NOW, YOU USED THE WORD PARANOID CONDUCT. 
8 A YEAH. 
9 Q PARANOID CONDUCT. WHAT DOES THAT MEAN TO YOU? 
10 A THAT'S SOMEBODY WHO JUST HAVE LOST HIS SENSES, 
11 YOU KNOW, WHO IS FIRED UP ABOUT EVERYTHING YOU DO. YOU 
12 NEVER, YOU KNOW, TAKING WHATEVER YOU DO AS SOMETHING AND 
13 ALWAYS AFTER YOUR OWN, YOU KNOW, THE WAY HE FEELS ABOUT IT. 
14 Q IS IT SOMEONE WHO IS SUSPICIOUS ABOUT OTHER 
15 PEOPLE? 
16 A ABOUT OTHER PEOPLE. 
17 Q DID YOU EVER, EVER, IN NIGERIA NOTICE EMMANUEL 
18 TO BE A SUSPICIOUS PERSON WHO ACCUSED OTHER PEOPLE OF 
19 CONSPIRING AGAINST HIM EVER? 
20 A NO. 
21 Q HAVE YOU SEEN OTHER EXAMPLES THAT YOU'D CARE 
22 TO RELATE TO THE JURY OF A CHANGE IN PERSONALITY? 
23 A YEAH. 
24 Q WHAT HAVE YOU SEEN? 
25
 A EMMANUEL IS LIKE IN HIS--IN COMPARISON, EMMANUEL 
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1 BELIEVES THAT A CHILD SHOULD BEHAVE LIKE AN ADULT, SO I 
2 WAS IN HIS HOUSE WITH MY WIFE--
3 Q WHEN? 
4 A IT WAS IN JULr. 
5 Q OKAY. 
6 A OKAY, I WAS IN HIS HOUSE WITH MY WIFE TO WHERE 
7 WE ALL TALKING THEN THE KID WAS CRYING. ABOUT SIX MONTHS--
8 Q THAT1S TORY? 
9 A YEAH, THE DAUGHTER. VICTORIA. SO SHE GOES UP, 
10 HE JUST GETS UP FROM THAT PLACE AND PICKS THE KID UP AND 
11 THREW THE KID. THEN THE WIFE GOT UP AND NOW, TRIED TO, 
12 STARTED TO GET INTO THE BEDROOM. AT THAT TIME MY WIFE WAS 
13 SURPRISED WITH THAT btHAVlOR. SHE GOT UP. I SAY, WOMAN, 
14 KNOWING THE FEELING OF THE WIFE YOU HAVE, AND THEN WENT TO 
15 THE BEDROOM. EMMANUEL CAME OUT. I SAID EMMANUEL, WHY 
16 SHOULD YOU DO THIS. HE SAID THE KID IS ALWAYS OUT TO FRUS-
17 TRATE ME. 
18 Q HE SAID THE KID IS ALWAYS OUT TO FRUSTRATE ME? 
19 MR. STEGALL: YOUR HONOR, I APPRECIATE THE 
20 PROBLEMS THAT WE'RE HAVING WITH COMMUNICATION BUT I THINK 
21 THERE IS A LOT OF LEADING GOING ON THAT REALLY ISN'T 
22 NECESSARY. 
23 JUDGE CROFT: YES. DON'T REPEAT EVERYTHING THAT 
24 J YOU THINK HE SAYS, MR. SYKES. 
MR. SYKES: I JUST WANT TO MAKE CERTAIN THINGS 
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ARE UNDERSTOOD, YOUR HONOR. 
Q (BY MR. SYKES) OKAY. GO AHEAD. YOU WERE 
SAYING? 
A SO HE SAID THIS KID IS ALWAYS OUT TO FRUSTRATE 
ME. I SAID, HOW DO YOU THINK A KID OF SIX MONTHS IS OUT 
TO FRUSTRATE YOU. SHE KNOWS WHAT SHE IS DOING. HE IS 
SUPPOSED TO KNOW A KID IS A KID NO MATTER WHAT, WHATEVER 
THEY DO. THEY ARE ALWAYS CRYING AND OTHER THINGS. THERE-
FORE, YOU, AS A FATHER, TO BE PERSUADING THEM NOW AND NOT 
TO GET ANGRY WITH WHAT SHE'S DOING. YOU KNOW. HE HIMSELF 
EXPLODED ON ME AS WELL. HE SAID THAT ALWAYS TIME I LIKE 
TO STAND AND SUPPORT. THAT'S WHY I SAID--
Q I?ri SORRY, REPEAT THAT LAST SENTENCE. 
A HE SAID THAT'S WHY HE ALWAYS SAID I'M ALWAYS 
AGAINST HIM. I NEVER SUPPORTED WHATEVER HE SAID. I 
SUPPORTED HIM. 
JUDGE CROFT: I THINK HE'S ANSWERED THE QUESTION, 
MR. SYKES: IfM SORRY, YOUR HONOR, I DIDN'T 
UNDERSTAND. 
THE WITNESS: I SAID HE ALWAYS SAID THAT I'M 
ALWAYS AGAINST HIM. I!M NOT AGAINST YOU, I'M JUST TRYING 
TO EXPLAIN TO YOU JUST TO MAKE YOU UNDERSTAND. I'M NOT 
AGAINST YOU FOR WHATEVER. 
Q (BY MR. SYKES) OKAY. HAVE YOU SEEN ANY OTHER 
PERSONALITY PROBLEMS THAT MR. ONYEABOR HAS HAD SINCE THE 
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1 ACCIDENT? 
2 J A YEAH, HE FINDS IT DIFFICULT NOW TO COME WITH 
3 KIDS, WITH FRIENDS, AND NOT OFTEN FRIENDS AS WE USED TO BE 
4 BEFORE. HE HAS LOST A LOT OF THEM BECAUSE HE CAN'T BE ABLE 
5 TO GET ALONG WITH THEM ANY MORE. HE CAN'T EVEN PARTICIPATE 
6 IN ANY CONVERSATION. HE CAN'T PARTICIPATE. IF HE WOULD 
7 PREFER TO BE SILENT IN A CONVERSATION OR HE WILL START 
8 JUMPING FROM ONE PERSON TO THE OTHER. SO MOST OF THE 
9 FRIENDS WILL BE ABLE TO KEEP TO YOU ESPECIALLY THE ONES THAT 
10 DON'T KNOW HIM MUCH, BUT SOMEONE WHO KNOW HIM THIS IS JUST 
11 A PROBLEM THAT PS OVERLOOKED. SO I APPEAR FOR MY BEHAVIOR, 
12 SO I HAVE TO KEEP IT UP WITH HIM AS A FRIEND. 
13 Q OKAY. MR. CHUKWU, WHEN DID YOU FIRST BEGIN--
14 YOU RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES IN SEPTEMBER OF '85. WHEN 
15 DID YOU FIRST BEGIN NOTICING THESE PROBLEMS WITH MR. 
16 ONYEABOR? 
17 A I STARTED NOTICING THEM IMMEDIATELY THAT HE WAS 
18 LIMPING AND UNABLE TO STAND UP, SIT UP RIGHT BECAUSE HE CAME 
19 TO MY HOUSE. 
20 Q I'M SORRY, WHEN DID YOU FIRST BEGIN NOTICING 
21 THE PERSONALITY PROBLEMS? 
22 A RIGHT AWAY. THAT IS THE TWO WEEKS WHEN HE CAME 
23 TO VISIT ME. THAT IS WHEN 1 STARTED TO SEE HIM AND--
24 JUDGL CROFT: YOU'VE ANSWERED HIS QUESTION. 
25 THE WITNESS: AND--
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JUDGE CROFT: JUST A MOMENT, PLEASE. I WANT 
YOU TO CONFINE YOUR ANSWER TO WHAT HIS QUESTION IS. HE 
SAID, WHEN DID YOU FIRST BEGIN TO NOTICE IT, YOU SAID TWO 
WEEKS AFTER. THAT IS AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION. 
Q (BY MR. SYKES) THAT!S TWO WEEKS AFTER YOU 
6 RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES IN SEPTEMBER OF !85? 
7 A YEAH. 
8 Q HAVE YOU NOTICED ANY MENTAL PROBLEMS OF MR. 
9 ONYEABOR SINCE THE ACCIDENT? BY "MENTAL" I MEAN THINGS LIKE 
10 THINKING PROCESS, INTELLIGENCE, MEMORY, CONCENTRATION, THOSE 
11 TYPES OF PROBLEMS. HAVE YOU NOTICED ANY OF THOSE TYPES OF 
12 PROBLEMS SINCE THE ACCIDENT? 
13 A YEAH. 
14 Q WHAT HAVE YOU NOTICED? 
15 A OKAY. I'VE NOTICED THAT HE HAVE LOST HIS SENSE 
16 OF THINKING. 
17 Q SENSE OF THINKING? 
18 A YEAH. 
19 Q WELL, EXPLAIN THAT. 
20 A OKAY. I CALLED AT HIS HOME ONE DAY AND I JUST 
21 CALLED HIM BECAUSE NORMALLY I WASN'T AROUND TO CALL TO FIND 
22 OUT HOW HE IS DOING WITH THE FAMILY. SO I CALLED UP. SO 
23 THE WIFE TOLD ME THAT, YOU KNOW, THAT HE!S NOT HOME. I SAID 
24 CAN YOU TELL HIM TO CALL ME. AFTER TALKING WITH THE WIFE 
25 SHE SAID HE WILL NOT BE THERE, HE WILL NOT BE COMING HOME 
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1 THAT NIGHT, SO PARTICULAR TO ME, LIKE I'M MARRIED, 1 KNOW 
2 WHAT IT MEANS FOR A MARRIED MAN TO BE, LIKE MYSELF, BEING 
3 IN OGDEN AND SLEEPING OUTSIDE. 
4 MR. STEGALL: YOUR HONOR, I THINK WE ARE GETTING 
5 A LOT OF HEARSAY IN THIS ANSWER. 
6 JUDGE CROFT: CONTROL YOUR WITNESS MORE, MR. 
7 SYKES. JUST ASK HIM A SIMPLE QUESTION AND GET AN ANSWER. 
8 MR. SYKES: WELL, I AM TRYING TO DO THAT, YOUR 
9 HONOR, AND NOT TO LEAD HIM AT THE SAME TIME. 
10 JUDGE CROFT: I KNOW BUT THESE YOUNG ONES TEND 
11 TO MAKE A SPEECH IN RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTION. 
12 Q (BY MR. SYKES) OKAY, PATRICK, I WANT YOU TO 
13 I COMMENT Oh ANY CnANGES, AN'i CnANGES, ANY MENTAL PROBLEMS 
14 THAT MR. ONYEABOR HAS HAD SINCE THE ACCIDENT. BY THAT I 
15 AM TALKING ABOUT--WELL, LET'S JUST DO THIS. HAVE YOU 
16 NOTICED ANY PROBLEMS IN RIGIDITY OF THINKING, THINKING 
17 PROCESS BEING TOO RIGID? 
18 A YEAH. THE WIFE GIVE ME A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL 
19 WHERE HE WAS AT. SO I PICKED UP A PHONE, I CALLED HIM, SO 
20 I TOLD THE FRIEND TO PUT HIM ON THE PHONE IF HE IS THERE. 
21 THE GUY SAID HE IS THERE. I SAID, CAN I TALK TO HIM. HE 
22 SAID, OKAY. HE PUT HIM ON THE PHONE SO I STARTED ASKING 
23 HIM WHY HE SHOULD BE OUTSIDE AND SLEEPING THERE INSTEAD OF 
24 SLEEPING AT HOME. THEN HE HIMSELF EXPLODED. HE SAID WHY 
25 SHOULD I ALWAYS BE STARTING ASKING HIM. I SAID, IfM NOT 
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APPENDIX E 
TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-46 
(2) Every person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished upon 
a first conviction by imprisonment for a period of not less than five days 
nor more than six months or by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than 
$299, or by both such fine and imprisonment. On a second or subsequent 
conviction, the person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 
ten days nor more than six months, or by a fine of not less than $50 nor 
more than $299 or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
"Assured clear distance ahead" or "radius 
of lights" application of doctrine to accident 
involving pedestrian crossing street or high-
way, 31 ALR 2d 1424. 
Excuse for exceeding speed limit for auto-
mobiles, 29 ALR 883. 
Homicide or assault in connection with 
operation of automobile at unlawful speed, 99 
ALR 756. 
Liability of one fleeing police for injury 
resulting from collision of police vehicle with 
another vehicle, person, or object, 51 ALR 3d 
1226. 
"Residence district," "business district," 
"school area," and the like, in statutes and 
ordinances regulating speed of motor vehi-
cles, 50 ALR 2d 343. 
Statute prohibiting reckless driving; defi-
niteness and certainty, 12 ALR 2d 580. 
Validity, construction, and application of 
criminal statutes specifically directed against 
racing of automobiles on public streets or 
highways (drag racing), 24 ALR 3d 1286. 
Validity of statute or ordinance forbidding 
running of automobile so as to inflict damage 
or injury, 47 ALR 255. 
What amounts to reckless driving, 86 ALR 
1273, 52 ALR 2d 1337. 
When automobile is under control, 28 ALR 
952. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, $35; C. 1943, 
57-7-112; L. 1978, ch. 33, } 9. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1978 amendment deleted "or on a con-
viction under this section subsequent to a 
conviction under an ordinance as provided in 
section 41-6-43(b)" after "subsequent convic-
tion" near the beginning of the second sen-
tence of subsec. (2), substituted "$299" for 
"$1,000" near the end of subsec. (2); deleted 
the last two sentences of subsec. (2) which 
provided that second violation had to occur 
within three years of the preceding violation 
and for suspension of license by department; 
and made minor changes in phraseology and 
style. 
Former jeopardy. 
Conviction of motorist for reckless driving 
held not bar to subsequent prosecution for 
involuntary manslaughter. State v. Empey 
(1925) 65 U 609, 239 P 25, 44 ALR 558, 
reviewed in State v Thatcher (1945) 108 U 
63, 157 P 2d 258. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles <3=> 330 
61A CJS Motor Vehicles §§ 609-624. 
Reckless driving, 7A AmJur 2d 499 et seq., 





41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate speeds at intersections, crossings, and 
curves — Prima facie speed limits — Emergency power of the governor. 
41-6-47. Prima facie limit. 
41-6-48. Speed Restrictions — Powers of local authorities. 
41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations. 
41-6-50. Special speed limit on bridges — Prima facie evidence. 
41-6-51. Speed contest or exhibition on highway — Barricade or obstruction therefor. 
41-6-52. Violation - Pleading. 
41-6-52.1 Repealed. 
41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate speeds at inter-
sections, crossings, and curves — Prima facie speed limits — Emer-
gency power of the governor. (1) No person shall drive a vehicle at a 
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41-6-46 MOTOR VEHICLES 
speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and 
having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. Consistent 
with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed 
when approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing, 
when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, 
when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when special 
hazards exist with resi>ect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of 
weather or highway conditions. 
(2) Where no special hazard exists the following speeds shall be lawful 
but any speed in excess of said limits shall be prima facie evidence that 
the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful: 
(a) Twenty miles per hour 
When passing a school building or the grounds thereof during school 
recess or while children are going to or leaving school during opening or 
closing houjrs, provided, that local authorities may require a complete stop 
before passing a school building or grounds at any of said periods. 
(b) Twenty-five miles per hour in any urban district 
(c) Fifty-five miles per hour in other locations. 
The speed limits set forth in this section may be altered as authorized 
in subsection (3) and sections 41-6-47 and 41-6-48. 
(3) The governor by proclamation, in time of war or emergency, may 
change the speed on the highways of the state 
History C 1953 41 6 46 enacted b> L 
1978 (2nd S S ), ch 9 §1 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1978 (2nd S S) , ch 9, § 1 repealed old 
section 41-6-46 (L 1941, ch 52, §36, C 1943, 
57 7 113, L 1951, ch 72, § 1, 1957, ch 76, § 1 
1959, ch 66, § 1, 1978, ch 34, § 1), relating to 
speed regulations, and enacted new section 
41-6-46 
Title of Act. 
An act repealing and re-enacting section 
41-6-46, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended by chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1957, 
as amended by chapter 66, Laws of Utah 
1959, as amended by chapter 34, Laws of 
Utah 1978, and section 41 2 19, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 85 
Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by chapter 
34 Laws of Utah 1978, relating to highway 
speeds and points for certain speeding 
offenses, providing for maximum speeds pro 
viding for suspensions of licenses for certain 
offenses, providing for the assessment of 
points for certain violations and the basis for 
and effect of such points, providing for new 
licensure after suspension, and providing for 
heanngs and re-examinations — Laws 1978 
(2nd S S ), ch 9 
Cross-Reference*. 
Municipal regulations, 10 8-30 
Reckless driving, 41 6 45 
Construction and application. 
This section requires that driver shall not 
drive at speed greater than is reasonable and 
prudent in view of existing conditions and 
hazards on highway, that his speed shall be 
controlled so as to avoid colliding with other 
vehicles entering or upon highway in lawful 
manner, and that speed shall be appropri-
ately reduced when special hazards exist 
with respect to other traffic or by reason of 
weather conditions Horsley v Robinson 
(1947) 112 U 227,186 P 2d 592. 
Constitutionality. 
A former speed law was held constitutional 
as against contention that it violated Const 
Art VI, §23 State v Brown (1928) 75 U 37, 
282 P 785 
Former jeopardy. 
Conviction of motorist charged with 
speeding under this section does not bar 
subsequent prosecution for involuntary man-
slaughter State v Thatcher (1945) 108 U 63, 
157 P 2d 258 
Instructions. ,. 
In action arising out of car-pedestrian accK 
dent in California, evidence did not justify 
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Rule 51 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
fully tried and resulted in a verdict and judg-
ment for the defendant, the court's later ruling 
granting defendant's motion to dismiss was a 
nullity and the plaintiff could not appeal there-
from but should base any appeal upon the ver-
dict and judgment and the rulings refusing to 
vacate them. Roche v. Zee, 1 Utah 2d 193, 264 
P.2d 865 (1953). 
—Splitting of negligence and damages is-
sues. 
Judgment n.o.v. in favor of patient in per-
sonal injury action against hospital on the 
question of negligence and ordering of new 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur . 2d Judgments 
§§ 106 to 151; 75 Am. Jur . 2d Trial § 463 et 
seq. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 59 to 61; 
88 C.J.S. Trial S§ 249 to 265. 
A.L.R. — Dismissal, nonsuit, judgment, or 
direction of verdict on opening statement of 
counsel in civil action, 5 A.L.R.3d 1405. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of counsel's 
argument or comment as to trial judge's re-
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, in the first paragraph, deleted "during 
the trial" following "time" in the first sentence, 
made a minor punctuation change in the sec-
trial to determine amount of damages was im-
proper since, in personal iniurv action, que* 
tion of how accident happened, who was at 
fault, and pain and injury occasioned thereby 
are so intermingled that if trial is ordered, in 
fairness to both parties, it should be on all is* 
sues. Hyland v. St. Mark's Hosp., 19 Utah 2<j 
134, 427 P.2d 736 (1967). 
Cited in Collier v. Frerichs, 626 P.2d 47$ 
(Utah 1981); Jepsen v. Tenhoeve, 656 P.2d 42j 
(Utah 1982); Wilderness Bldg. Sys. v. Cbaft 
man, 699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985). 
fusal to direct verdict against him, 10 A.L.R$1 
1330. 
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action 
as affected by opponent's motion for summary 
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
rected verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. 
Key Numbers . — Judgment *=» 199; Trial •»• 
167 to 181. 
ond sentence, and inserted "of" in the next-to-
last sentence; and substituted "jurors" for 
"jury" in the second sentence in the second 
paragraph. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections. 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably 
directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury fa 
the law as set forth in said requests. The court shall inform counsel of its 
proposed action upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall 
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties 
stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or otherwise waive this 
requirement. If the instructions are to be given in writing, all objections 
thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, 
objections may be made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the 
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In object-
ing to the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the fore^ 
going requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of 
justice, may review the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity 
shall be given to make objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing « 
the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, 
and if the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors that 
they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
144 
Rule 59 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 47 Am Jur 2d Judgments judgment against one joint tort feasor as re* 
* 979 et seq lease of others, 40 A L R 3d 1181 
C.J.S. — 49 C J S Judgments §§ 574 to 584 Key Numbers. — Judgment «» 891 to 899 
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any ^ 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in ari 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has beerf 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions trf 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a ne*g 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may Drder a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v Gray, 717 P 2a 1313 lUtan 
1986), State v Banner, 717 P 2d 1325 (Utah 
1986) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev 95, 130 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground 
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions were asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further 
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making 
of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being sug-
gested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof 
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Pla in er ror . Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 103 is Szarak v Sandoval, 636 P 2d 1082 (Utah 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is in conformity 1981) Rule 103(d) is a restatement of the plain 
with Rules 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Evidence
 e r r o r ^ l e See Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), Rule 61 Utah Rules of C m l Procedure
 ( 1 9 7 1 ) and S t a t e v P o e > 2 l Utah 2d 113, 441 
and Utah case law not involving constitutional po<\ 519 (1968) 
considerations Subsection (aXD is in accord ~ _ _ „ . , 
with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) Cross-References. - Harmless error m ad-
and Stagmeyer v Leatham Bros, 20 Utah 2d mission or exclusion of evidence, Rule 61 
421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968) See also Bradford v U R C P. 
Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980), 







—Offer of proof 
—Substantial right or prejudice 
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Rule 302. Applicability of federal law in civil actions and 
proceedings. 
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact 
which is an element of a claim or defense as to which federal law supplies the 
rule of decision is determined in accordance with federal law 
Advisory Commit tee Note — The text of criminal cases are not treated in this rule See 
this rule is taken from Rule 302, Uniform Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-503 (1953) 
Rules of Evidence (1974) Presumptions in or any subsequent revision of that section 
ARTICLE IV. 
RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evldence , , means evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence 
Advisory Commit tee Note — This rule is prove or disprove the existence of any mate 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable nal fact n Avoiding the use of the term "mate-
in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evi- rial fact" accords with the application given to 
dence (1971), but the former rule defined rele- former Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court 
vant evidence as that having a tendency to State v Peterson, 560 P 2d 1387 (Utah 1977) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of remoteness 
Cited 
Effect of remoteness Cited in State v Gray 717 P 2d 1313 (Utah 
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the 1986), State v Nickles, 728 P 2d 123 (Utah 
evidence and not its admissibility Terry v 1986) 
Zions Coop Mercantile Ins t , 605 P 2d 314 
(Utah 1979) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi- Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah 
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L Rev 63, 78 L Rev 839 
United States v. Downing Novel Scientific 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible 
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Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively 
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as 
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence The 
change in language is not one of substance, 
since "surprise" would be witnm the concept of 
unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402 
[Rule 403] See also Advisory Committee Note 
to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a contin-
uance in most instances would be a more ap-
propriate method of dealing with "surprise " 
See also Smith v Estelle 445 F Supp 647 




Credibility of witness 
Cumulative evidence 
Determination of admissibility 
Expert testimony 
Film of murder scene 
Guilty plea 










The right to cross-examine regarding bias is 
limited by this rule State v Hackford, 737 
P 2d 200 (Utah 1987) 
Circumstantial evidence. 
Circumstantial evidence, although relevant, 
may nevertheless be excluded if the usefulness 
of the evidence is more than counterbalanced 
bv its disadvantageous effects in confusing the 
issues before the jury or in creating an undue 
prejudice in excess of its legitimate probative 
weight Terry v Zions Coop Mercantile Inst 
605 P2d 314 (Utah 1979) 
testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and 
violation of due process) See the following 
Utah cases to the same effect Terry v Zions 
Coop Mercantile Inst, 605 P2d 314 (Utah 
1979), State v Johns, 615 P2d 1260 (Utah 
1980), Reiser v Lohner, 641 P 2d 93 (Utah 
1982) 
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed refer-
ence to "Rule 403w in the Advisory Committee 
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule 
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice** and 
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference 
Cross-References — Admissibility of evi 
dence Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a) 
Credibility of witness. 
This rule is not to be used to allow the trial 
judge to substitute his assessment of the credi-
bility of testimony for that of the jury by ex-
cluding testimony simply because he does not 
find it credible State v Branch, 743 P 2d 1187 
(Utah 1987) 
Cumulative evidence 
While there may have been little reason to 
admit into evidence transcripts of recorded 
conversations between the defendant and a 
government informant because the evidence 
was cumulative, their admission was not sub-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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the backhoe had been maintained in a proper 
condition by defendant even though the me-
chanic never observed, nor did ne have per-
sonal knowledge of, any specific acts by defen-
dant or its employees that would constitute im-
proper maintenance ShurtlefT v Jay Tuft & 
Co, 622 P 2 d 1168 (Utah 1980) 
—Witnesses at trial. 
An expert's opinion may be based upon evi-
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and comports with 





The expertise of the witness, his degree of 
familiarity with the necessary facts, and the 
logical nexus between his opinion and the facts 
adduced must be established before an experts 
opinion is admissible as to an ultimate issue 
Ldwards v Didencksen, 597 P 2d 1328 (Uiah 
1979) (referred to in Advisory Committee 
Note) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim The substance of 
this rule was formerly found in Rules 57 and 
58, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) The re-
quirement that an expert disclose the underly-
ing facts or data for his opinion when cross ex 
amined was formerly found in Rule 58 Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971) The discretion vested 
dence given at trial by other witnesses 
Edwards v Didencksen, 597 P 2d 1328 (Utah 
iy7yj (referred to in Advisory Committee 
Note) 
Cited in State v Suarez, 736 P 2d 1040 
(Utah 1987) 
Edwards v Didencksen, 597 P 2d 1328 (Utah 
1979) 
Opinion testimony of expert witness was not 
rendered inadmissible by fact that it may have 
embraced the ultimate factual issue to be de-
cided by the jury ShurtlefT v Jay Tuft & Co , 
622 P2d 1168 (Utah 1980) 
Cited in ShurtlefT v Jay Tuft & Co , 622 
P2d 1168 (Utah 1980) 
in the trial judge to require pnor disclosure of 
underlying facts or data should be liberally ex-
ercised in situations where there has not been 
adequate discovery in civil cases or disclosure 
in cnminal cases 
Cross-References. — Scope of examination 
and cross-examination, Rule 43(b), U R C P 
Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue. 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Rule 705. Disclosure of facts or data underlying expert 
opinion. 
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons 
therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the 
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose 
the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. 
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Chemical breath analysis. the exclusion of evidence not subject to cross-
Section 41-6-44.3, governing the admission examination concerning the truthfulness of the 
of chemical breath analysis, is a valid statu- matters asserted. State v. Long, 721 P 2d 483 
tory exception to the hearsay rule Layton City (Utah 1986). 
v Bennett, 741 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct App. 1987). 
Purpose. 
The hearsay rule has as its declared purpose 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant im-
material. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declar-
ant is available as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining 
an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event 
or condition or immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement 
caused by the event or condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A 
statement of the declarants then existing state of mind, emotion, sensa-
tion, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental 
feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory 
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the 
execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. 
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and de-
scribing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, 
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source 
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a 
matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insuffi-
cient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shown to 
have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in 
his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the mem-
orandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be re-
ceived as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, re-
port, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, 
opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information 
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regu-
larly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that 
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compi-
lation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances 
of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term business" as 
used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profes-
sion, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for 
profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the pro-
visions of Paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the 
memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in 
accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccur-
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rence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made 
and preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data 
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) 
the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to 
duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to repprtr 
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers 
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceed-
ings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings re-
sulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted byjb^; 
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any 
form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thei'eof 
was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law. 
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a 
record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoc-
currence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, 
or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a 
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accor-
dance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose 
the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry. 
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, mar^ 
riages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or 
marriage, or other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in 
a regularly kept record of a religious organization. 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of 
fact contained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or 
other ceremony or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, pub-
lic official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a reli-
gious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting 
to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time 
thereafter. 
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family 
history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings; on 
rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or 
tombstones, or the like. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The 
record of a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in prop-: 
erty, as proof of the content of the original recorded document and its 
execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been 
executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable 
statute authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in that office. 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A 
statement contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an 
interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the 
document, unless dealings with the property since the document was 
made have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the pur-
port of the document. 
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(16) Sta tements in ancient documents . Statements in a document in 
existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established. 
(17) Market repor ts , commercial publicat ions. Market quotations, 
tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally 
used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupa-
tions. 
(18) Learned t reatises. To the extent called to the attention of an 
expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct 
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or 
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, estab-
lished as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness 
or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the state-
ments may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputa-
tion among members of his family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or 
among his associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, 
adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, 
adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of his personal or 
family history. 
(20) Reputa t ion concerning boundar ies or general history. Repu-
tation in a community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of 
or customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events 
of general history important to the community or State or nation in which 
located. 
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character 
among his associates or in the community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, 
entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo 
contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain 
the judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution in a 
criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments 
against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may 
be shown but does not affect admissibility. 
(23) J u d g m e n t as to personal , family or general history, or 
boundar i e s . Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general 
history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be 
provable by evidence of reputation. 
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of 
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is 
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative 
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general 
purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not 
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known 
to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to 
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, 
his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the 
name and address of the declarant. 
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